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FIDUCIARY POWERS
MAURICE C. CULLITY*
Toronto

A power collateral is of the nature of an authority to deal with an
estate, no interest in which is vested in the donee of the power.
A power of that nature is wholly different from an estate or interest,
and cannot without abuse of language be so designated . It may
be conceded that such a power may in one sense be the subject
of a trust, that is, it may be coupled with an obligation as to its
exercise ; and there may be a person entitled to insist on the performance
of the obligation ; and therefore by a metaphorical and incorrect
use of language, such a power may be called the subject of a trust,
the donee may be described as a trustee, and the person calling
for the exercise of the power may be termed a cestui que trust. But
if this be conceded, the subject matter of the trust still remains in its
integrity as a simple power or authority to be distinguished from an
estate or interest .'
The notion that there are some powers which fall , midway
between duties and discretionary powers can be traced back at
least as far as the decision of Sir John Verney M.It., in Harding
v. Glyn .`= It became firmly established as part of the conceptual
framework of property law after the judgment of Lord Eldon
L.C ., , in Brown v. Fliggs 3 and today it is deeply embedded in
much of the law relating to powers which exist under trust
instruments. Although it might now seem unduly optimistic to
* Maurice C. Cullity, of Osgoode Mall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
1 Diclcererora v . Teasdale (1862), 1 De G.J . & S. 52, at pp . 59-60,
per Westbury L.C.
s (1801), 8

Ves.

561 .
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hope that lawyers will cease to speak of "trust powers" or "powers
in the nature of trusts", the use of such language has been
criticized.' It is suggested that the criticism is justified not only
on analytical grounds but also on the basis of the considerable
confusion which the use of the traditional terminology has introduced into the substantive law. It is easily demonstrable that the
terms have been used in a variety of senses and that the danger
that counsel or judges will slip from one sense to another or fail
to appreciate the meaning attributed to one or other of the terms
in some earlier case is far from fanciful .
1. Powers and Duties.

When lawyers speak of powers which exist under trust instruments
they do not normally intend the word "power" to mean simply
a lawful ability to change the legal relationships which subsist
under the trust. They intend to convey not only that the ability
exists but also that the donee is under no duty to exercise it. The
concept of a power is one which, in Hohfeldian terms, is coupled
with a liberty or a privilege rather than a duty .
Powers are never imperative : they leave the act to be done at the will
of the party to whom they are given . Trusts are always imperative, and
are obligatory upon the conscience of the party intrusted .5

Powers in this sense are often described as discretionary
powers although that description is sometimes used more narrowly
to refer to those powers which are expressed to be exercisable
by reference only to the personal opinion or judgment of their
donees . Analytically there appears to be no merit in the distinction but it has been used on occasion to justify a conclusion that
a clause which was drafted in empowering terms imposed a duty'
or to justify an exercise of the court's supervisory jurisdiction
over a power which was not discretionary in the narrow sense.7
} E.g., Dickenson v . Teasdale, supra, footnote 1 ; Palmer v . Locke
(1880), 15 Ch .D . 294, at pp . 302-303, per Cotton L.J .; Gray, Powers
in Trust and Gifts Implied in Default of Appointment (1911-1912), 25
Harv . L. Rev. 1.
A .-G . v. Lacly Downing (1767), Wilm . 1, at p. 23, per Wilmot
L.C.J .
'See, e .g ., Mortimer v . Watts (1852), 14 Beav . 616.
7 See, e.g ., Tempest v . Lord Camoys (No . 4) (1888), 58 L.T . 221 .
On this topic Professor Ronald Dworkin's analysis of the concept of
judicial discretion is helpful: Judicial Discretion (1963), 60 J . of Phil . 624,
The Model of Rules (1967), 35 U . of Chi. L. Rev. 14 . Dworkin identifies
and distinguishes three ways in which we speak of a person having discretion : (a) where he has a duty which is defined by standards that reasonable
persons can interpret in different ways ; (b) where he has power to make
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Powers which exist under trust instruments are limited by
the words which define the scope of the power and the circumstances in which it will become exercisable and by the principles
which the courts apply in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction over all trusts . As far as limitations of the second kind
are concerned there is an important distinction between powers
which are given to trustees in their capacity as such and powers
which are given to trustees in their personal capacities or to
persons who are not trustees . A power which is vested in a trustee
qua trustee is subject to a much greater degree of control by the
court. Constructionally or otherwise the ambit of the power is
likely to be affected by the trustee's general standard of care and
by his duty to hold an even hand between the beneficiaries of
the trust. His freedom is limited also by the standards which
govern the mental process by which he arrives at a decision to
exercise the power or to refrain from so doing: he must turn his
mind to the existence of the power, his decision must not be
arbitrary, he must consider all factors relevant to 'the power and
only such factors and he must not attempt to exercise the power
in order to achieve a purpose other than that for which it was
given.$
In particular cases the existence of the supervisory jurisdiction will appear to blur the line between a trustee's duties and
his discretionary powers in the wide sense. Consider, for example,
a trust to accumulate income until the beneficiary attains the age
of twenty-five years with a discretionary power to apply income
for his maintenance in the meantime. Despite the existence of the
a decision which is . final in the sense that no higher authority can set
it aside; and (c) where on a particular issue there are no standards which
are to be applied in reaching a decision . The discretionary powers of
trustees involve, discretion in the first sense. They will also contain discretion
in the second sense if a court decides that sufficient attention has been
paid to the relevant standards. A trustee's duty to apply a "reasonable"
amount of income for the maintenance - of a particular beneficiary will
normally confer discretion in only the first sense as a court will usually
review decisions made in the application of what it regards as an
"objective" standard . A power of appointment given to a person who
is not a trustee would seem to involve discretion in the third sense.
Much of the uncertainty as to the status of the "absolute and uncontrollable" discretionary powers of trustees stems from the fact that judges
have sometimes used language which might suggest that such powers
involve discretion in the third and strongest sense. The standards which
govern the discretions of trustees can be weakened by appropriate words
in the instrument but any attempt to exclude them completely would be
inconsistent with the fiduciary position of the trustee. See, generally, Cullity,
Judicial Control of Trustees' Discretions (1975), 25 U. of T. L.J . 99.
8 See Cullity, op . cit., ibid.
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discretion it is conceivable that circumstances might exist in which
a court would hold that a failure to apply any income for maintenance would be an abuse of discretion.0 In such circumstances
the application of the standards which the court regards as
governing an exercise of the power would abrogate the discretion
or the liberty of the trustee and impose an enforceable duty .
Where the power is not given to a trustee in his capacity as
such the court's supervisory jurisdiction is, in general, confined
to an application of the doctrine of a fraud on the power. This
doctrine imposes a duty on the donee not to exercise the power
for an improper purpose but the duty is owed not to the objects
of the power but rather to the persons entitled in default if it is
not exercised ."" Apart from that obligation the donee owes no
enforceable duty to anyone . Judicial statements that such a person
holds the power as a fiduciary with a duty to exercise it are
only explicable in terms of a quite different concept of legal
obligation ."
IIf one focuses one's attention on the normal concept of a
legal duty which has as its correlative a legal right or claim in
some other person, the distinction between the discretionary
powers and duties which can exist under a trust is quite clear
analytically. It may be difficult to determine whether on the
construction of a particular instrument a discretionary power or
a duty has been created and, as has been mentioned above, the
application of the court's supervisory jurisdiction might in some
circumstances abrogate a discretion and replace it with a duty
but the conceptual distinction between a duty and a liberty or
discretion remains clear. What is confusing about the terminology
of trust powers or powers in the nature of trusts is that it tends
to suggest that such powers are distinct juridical concepts which
have some of the attributes of enforceable legal duties and some
of those of discretionary powers . When the terminology is applied
indiscriminately to powers which are, and to those which are
not, vested in trustees qua trustees the possibility of confusion is
increased considerably .
11. Trust Powers : Background and Terminology.
As the modern law of trusts began to emerge in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries the development of the notion of the
trust as a proprietary concept and the growth of the supervisory
9 Cf., Re Sayers & Philip (1973), 38 D .L .R . (3d) 602 ; Nickisson v .
Cockill (1863), 3 De G .J . & S . 622 .
"o Re Greares, [1954] Ch . 434, at p . 447, per Evershed M .R .
"See Harris, Trust, Power and Duty (1971), 87 L.Q . Rev . 31 .
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jurisdiction claimed by the court had a natural and understandable effect on the attitude of Chancery judges towards discretionary powers . While in principle the distinction between
discretions and trusts may have been clear there was an increasing
tendency to insist that some discretionary powers were affected
and limited by the fiduciary capacity of the donee or simply by
the fact that the power existed under a trust instrument. This
tendency has been detected in the attitude of courts towards
the administrative powers of executors and in particular in the
ultimate recognition that such powers were not destroyed by the
death of the executor named in a will. 12 It may be seen also in
the court's willingness to exercise powers in certain cases and in
the growth of the principle of a fraud on the power. 13
The strong presumption in favour of non-exclusive powers
and the doctrine of illusory appointments were more drastic
examples of this process of assimilation while the ability of judges
to glean an intention to create a trust from discretionary or
precatory words was so acute that in several cases where valid
powers might have been found the possibility was not considered. 14
In the nineteenth century with the development of the
principles of construction and a heightened awareness of their
function there was a retreat from some of the developments which
have been mentioned. The presumption in favour of non-exclusive
powers and the doctrine of illusory appointments were abolished
by statute, 15 judges refused to extend the principle of a fraud on
the power,", the rules relating to the release of powers were
12 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol . 7 (1925), pp . 171-176.
13 Ibid.
14 See, for example, Stubbs v . Sargon (1838), 3 lay. & Cr . 507 . In
the not uncommon case of property devised or bequeathed for such
persons or purposes as the executors should select it was only on the
rare occasion that judges in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries would
contemplate the possibility that a mere power had been created . Gibbs v.
Rumsey (1813), 2 Ves . & B . 294 was one of the exceptions and was
generally regarded as wrongly decided : see, Jarman on Wills (8th ed .,
1951), pp . 500, 726 and 900 . In some cases decided in this century judges
have been more reluctant to find an intention to create an (invalid) trust
in clauses of this kind : see, for example, In re Howell, [1915] 1 Ch . 241 ;
Re Pugh's Will Trusts, [1967] 3 All E .R . 337 ; Re Ogilvy, [1938] O .W.N.
417 ; Calcino v . Fletcher, [1969] Qd . R . 8 . The relevance of cases of
this kind to the question of certainty of objects and the rule against
delegation of testamentary power is considered infra at pp . 272 and 275
respectively .
15 (1830), 11 Geo . 4 & 1 Will . 4, c. 46 ; (1874), 37 & 38 Vic., c . 37 .
16E.g ., Coffin v . Cooper (1865), 2 Dr . & Sm . 365; Palmer v . Locke,
supra, footnote 4.
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relaxed by statute 17 and a marked change occurred in the courts'
attitude to precatory trusts ."' Despite these changes and the
criticism which was occasionally directed at the notion that
powers could in some important sense be regarded as fiduciary
or as the subject matter of a "trust", the controversial decision in
Re Weekes' Settlementl 9 and its acceptance in later cases ensured
that the concept of trust powers would not lose all its significance .
In this century the distinction between trust powers and discretionary powers received increasing emphasis in the context of the
rules relating to certainty of the objects of a trust until the tide
turned with the decision of the House of Lords in Re Baden's
Deed Trusts (No. I) .so Although that decision has deprived the
concept of much of its importance in the context of certainty it
raised a number of questions which are as yet unanswered and
it did not bear directly on the significance of trust powers for
other purposes.
Any attempt to enquire into the present importance of the
distinction between trust powers and discretionary powers is confronted immediately by a considerable variation in terminology.
The cases contain references to "trust powers", "fiduciary
powers", "powers held in trust", "powers in the nature of trusts",
"powers coupled with trusts" and "powers coupled with duties".
An indiscriminate use of these terms would be unimportant if it
were clear that they have always been intended to convey precisely the same meaning. This has not been the case and in the
interests of clarity it is necessary to distinguish between some of
the different senses in which one or other of the terms has been
used.
(1) Absence of discretion
In some cases the terminology has been employed merely
to indicate that an authority which had been given to trustees
and which might or might not appear to be a discretionary power
had in law no discretion attached to it. It involved in other words
a duty coupled with a power in the Hohfeldian sense rather than
a power coupled with a liberty or a discretion. In this sense the
terminology merely emphasizes the existence of a duty rather
than a discretion . In Tempest v. Lord Camoys (No. 3),21 for
17 The Conveyancing Act 1881, 44 & 45 Vic., c. 41, s. 52 (U.K.) ;
The Conveyancing Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vic., c. 39, s. 6 (U .K .) ; infra, p. 281 .
1s See Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (1974), pp . 101-102.
19 [18971 1 Ch. 289 .
=0 [19711 A .C . 424.
2 1 (1882), 21 Ch .D . 571.
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example, Jessel NI .R., referred to a clause which declared that
trustees should at their own discretion invest proceeds of a sale
of the trust property in the purchase of real property .

In the present case there was a power which amounts to a trust to
invest the fund in question in purchase of land . The trustees would not
be allowed by the court to disregard that trust, and if [the trustee] had
refused to invest the money in land at all the court would have found
no difficulty in interfering .22

(2) Discretion overridden

Occasionally the trust language has been used to justify the
power of the court to exercise or to interfere with the exercise of
a power which was intended to be discretionary . This was, for
example, done in one nineteenth century case in which it was
asserted that after an administration order had been made the
court was entitled to exercise discretionary powers which could
be regarded as part of a general scheme for the administration
of the estate . 23
(3) Powers conferred for the benefit of persons other than the
donee
One of the reasons which was commonly given for the rule
that, at common law, a special power collateral 24 could not be
released was that the donee had been entrusted with the power
for the benefit of persons other than himself.=5) In that sense the
power was often described as a fiduciary power, a power coupled
with a duty or a power in the nature of a trust. This was so
whether or not the donee was a trustee of the ,property which
was subject to the power.
(4) Fraud on the power
By the middle of the nineteenth century it was established
that the common power of a life tenant to appoint among his
222 Ibid ., at p . 578 . See, also, Mortimer v. Watts (1852), 14 Beav . 616, at
p . 622, per Romilly M .R .
23 Tempest v. Lord Camoys (No . 2) (1882), 21 Ch .D . 576n; cf ., Re
Courtier (1886), 34 Ch . 136 ; Nickisson v. Cockill, supra, footnote 9 ;
Re Bryant, [1894] 1 Ch . 324, at p . 331, per Chitty J .
24 The term "power collateral" is used here in its original senseviz ., a power held by a person who had no interest in the property to
which the power related : see, e .g ., Dickenson v. Teasdale, supra, footnote 1 .
For a recent shift in meaning see infra, p. 269 .
25 -Re Dunne's Trusts (1878), L.R . 1 In 516, aff'd ., (1880), 5 L.R . In
76 ; Re Eyre (1883), 49 L .T . 259 . Cf., Coffin v. Cooper, supra, footnote
16, at p . 373 per Kindersley V .C. ; Re Little (1889), 40 Ch .D . 418, at
p . 422, per Kay J .
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children could be released .26 Despite the authorities, judges continued to affirm the proposition that fiduciary powers or powers
in the nature of trusts could not be released . In view of the sense
in which those terms had been used in the cases involving
collateral powers' it is not surprising that there were still attempts
to argue that some powers in gross were fiduciary and were not
capable of release. In Palmer v. Locke '28 Cotton L.J., dismissed
such an argument in the following passage :'-9
But a fiduciary power in this case one must consider as a power which
is sometimes said to be given to the person as a trustee. Now I think
a great deal of inaccurate argument arises from expressions undeveloped and not explained which may bear two senses. How can you say
that a man is properly a trustee of a power? As I understand it, it
means this, in the words of Lord St . Leonards, that it must be fairly
and honestly executed . A donee of such a power cannot carry into
execution any indirect object or acquire any benefit for himself directly
or indirectly . That is, it is something given to him from which he is
to derive no beneficial interests. In that sense he is a trustee, and he is
liable to all the obligations of a trustee in this sense, that he must not
attempt to gain any indirect object by the execution of the power in a
way which in form is good, but which is a mere mask for something
that is bad.
In this weak sense the notion of a fiduciary power which is
vested in a person who is not a trustee simply recognizes the
existence of the doctrine of a fraud on the power.
(5) Powers given to trustees as an incident of their office

If the limitations inherent in the doctrine of a fraud on the
power justify the application of the fiduciary terminology to
powers which are not vested in trustees, the use of that termi
nology is even more appropriate to refer to any power which is
vested in a trustee by virtue of his office . The terms have been
used in this sense in some cases" and one of the important
questions relating to the ability to release a power is whether it
is only powers of this kind which are incapable of release in those
jurisdictions which have legislation based on the English Conveyancing Acts of 1881 and 1882 ."31
(', See Re Radcliffe, [1892] 1 Ch . 227, at p. 231, per Lindley L.J . ;
Sugden on Powers (8th ed ., 1861), pp . 88-90.
::7 Case cited, supra, footnote 25, and see Thacker v. Key (1869),
L.R . 8 Eq. 408.
28 Supra, footnote 4.
"a1bid . See, also, Scroggs v. Scroggs (1755), Amb. 812; Re Skeats
(1889), 42 Ch .D . 522; Re Sonies, supra, footnote 16, at p. 255, per
Chitty J .
."0 E.g ., Re Eyre, supra, footnote 25, at p. 260, per Kay J.
.3t E.g ., Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, R.S .O., 1970, c. 85,
s. 26 ; infra, pp . 281-283.
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(6) Discretionary trusts
In recent years the terms "trust power" and "power in the
nature of a trust" have been used most frequently in the context
of the rules which specify the degree of certainty required for the
objects of discretionary trusts . 32 For the purpose of those rules
the fiduciary terminology has been used to distinguish a trust
under which the -trustees have a duty to distribute income and a
discretionary power which extends only to the selection of the
persons who would receive it from one under which the trustees'
discretion would extend also to the question whether income was
to be distributed or retained as capital. Although in the early
cases on certainty of objects 33 the significant distinguishing factor
was thé existence or absence of a duty to make a distribution,
this factor is by itself inadequate to justify a conclusion that the
discretionary trust involves a unique or peculiar blend of duties
and powers . Precisely the same relationship between discretion
and duty exists with respect to many of the powers which are
commonly found in trust instruments . Consider, for example, a
settlement which directs trustees to retain stock dividends as
capital or to distribute them as income as the trustees in their
absolute discretion should think fit. Here there is no duty to
distribute but there is a duty to allocate stock dividends to capital
or to income . Analytically, there is no significant distinction
between the relationship of this duty to the discretionary power to
decide whether the dividends are to be distributed to the life
tenant or held for the remainderman and that which exists
between the duty to distribute and the discretionary power of
selection in the discretionary trust. Exactly the same relationship
will often exist between administrative duties and discretionary
powers as, for example, in the common case of a trustee's duty
to invest proceeds of sale in investments to be selected by him
at his discretion .
Nor will it help to isolate a special type of power if one
describes the element of discretion in discretionary trusts as a
discretion which relates to the manner in which a duty is per
formed . All discretionary powers which are given to trustees in
their capacity as trustees can be so described.
In some of the cases on discretionary trusts judges have
spoken more particularly and have emphasized not the duty to
distribute but rather the duty to exercise the power of selection.
32 See Waters, op . cit ., footnote 18, pp . 73-76 .

33 I .e ., the cases decided before Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No. I), supra,
footnote 20.
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There is an obvious ambiguity and, consequently, a possibility of
confusion when this language is applied to the discretionary
powers of trustees . It is not at all unusual for lawyers to say that
a trustee must exercise his discretions when all that is meant is
that he must turn his mind to the existence of his discretionary
powers and to consider whether or not to perform the acts which
are authorized by the power. In this sense a trustee is under a
duty to exercise all of his discretions.:,} Whether or not a power
to select beneficiaries of income or capital is coupled with a duty
to make a distribution, the trustees' obligations with respect to
its exercise in this sense are now very much the same. 35 In each
case, he must survey the range of objects and consider the claims
of each. The only significant distinction appears to be that :
A wider and more comprehensive range of inquiry is called for in the
;!
:
.
case of trust powers than in the case of powers

When, in the cases concerning certainty of objects, judges
have referred to the duty to exercise the discretion as the distinguishing factor, it is clear that their notion of an exercise of the
discretion has not usually been the one which has just been
referred to. They have been pointing to the existence of a duty
to make a selection. In this sense a trust power is one which
imposes upon the donee a duty to choose one of the courses of
action which are authorized by the power . Many of the administrative as well as the dispositive powers of trustees are of this
kind. In determining whether such a duty exists the absence of
imperative words is not necessarily decisive. In Re Haasz, 37 for
example, a clause in a will read as follows :
I empower my trustees at their sole discretion to convert into money
all or any of my Estate ; or to retain all or any of my Estate in the form
of asset in which it may be at my death; without their being held
responsible for any loss resulting from their so doing.

Despite its empowering form this clause created precisely the
same combination of duty and discretion as would be contained
in a clause which creates a discretionary trust. The crucial factor
is whether the instrument expressly, by implication or by presumption, indicates that if a decision to choose one of the courses
of action which are authorized by the power is not made, something else is to be done . If no such indication exists -if the
instrument indicates that the only authorized courses of action
34 Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No . 1), ibid., at pp . 449 and 456; Cullity,
op . cit., footnote 7.
35 Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No. 1), ibid., at p. 449.
36 Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No . 1), ibid ., at p. 457.
.37 (1959), 21 D .L .R . (2d) 12 .
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are those to which the discretionary power extends -the power
is a trust power. It might be objected that trustees who have a
duty to do A, subject to a discretionary power to do B or C, are
in a position which is for all practical purposes no different to
that of trustees who have a discretionary power to do A or B or C.
The significance is, of course, that, if the trustees are unable to
reach a decision in the first case, the duty to do A will prevail,
while in the second case they will have no alternative but to
apply to the court.38 In each case the trustees must attempt to
choose between A, B and . C but if the power is a trust power
their obligation will be more extensive. They will be under a duty
to make the choice or to see that the choice is made with the
aid of the court.
(7) Where the donee is not a trustee: duty to execute the power
The concept of trust powers to which Lord ]Eldon referred
in Frown v. Higgs39 " appears to be essentially the same as that
which has provided the focus of attention in the modern cases
concerning certainty of objects . Lord ]Eldon was concerned with
a power of selection which had been given to a trustee. In his
judgment this factor received some emphasis :40
[Harding v. Glyn] establishes this : that though upon a mere power this
court will not interpose, if it is not executed, yet if it is so- given as to
vest the power in the person having the whole legal interest, and to call
upon that person to execute the purpose, sufficiently expressed to make
it the duty of that person, if he fails in that duty, the Court will execute
it for him. . . . The principle of . . . all these cases, is, that, if the power
is a power, which it is the duty of the party to execute, made his duty
by the requisition of the will, put upon him as such by the testator,
who has given trim an interest extensive enough to enable him to discharge it, he is a trustee for the exercise of the power, and not as having
a discretion, whether he will exercise it or not; and the Court adopts
the principle as to trusts ; and will not permit his negligence, accident,
or other circumstances, to disappoint the interests of those, for whose
benefit he is called upon to execute it.
The inappropriateness of describing a person other than a trustee
as the donee of a trust power was recognized by Lord Alvanley,41
in the court below and by Byre C.B ., in the earlier case of Pull v.
Vardy.42 That case concerned a will by which the testator devised
several houses to his wife but gave her no other property . The
litigation arose over the following clause :
This is what occurred in Re Haasz, ibid .
Supra, footnote 3 .
40 Ibid ., at pp . 573-574 (italics added) .
41 (1800), 5 Ves. 495, at p. 507.
42 (1791), 1 Ves. 270.
3s
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I farther empower my wife to give away at her death one thousand
pounds ; 100 pounds of it to Elizabeth Turner; 100 pounds to Mrs .
Bennet ; the other eight hundred pounds to be disposed of by her will .
On the death of the widow, Elizabeth Turner claimed the sum
of 100 pounds from the widow's executor . The Chief Baron
said : 43
. . . where the absolute interest is given to one with any expression that
the devisee shall dispose of the whole, or a part to a particular person,
that does not amount to a devise properly ; but will raise a trust for
that person, which the court will execute after the death of the devisee.
For Defendant it was truly observed, that this doctrine could not affect
the present case ; because the wife had not only no absolute interest in
the 100 pounds, but none at all : so there is nothing to raise a trust .
In Brown v. Higgs Lord Alvanley distinguished Bull v. Vardy:

The testator did not give to his wife any interest in the general produce
of the estate : so it was a mere power.44

The restriction of the concept of trust powers to those which were
given to a trustee of the property to which the power related
appears to have been preferred by Lord St . Leonards45 but there
were some nineteenth century cases in which the concept and
the reasoning in Brown v. Higgs were extended to powers in gross
such as a life tenant's power to appoint among children . In
Burrough v. Philcox'46 for example, property was settled on trust
for certain persons for life with a direction that the remainder
interest should be disposed of among a class as the surviving life
tenant should appoint. Lord Cottenham L.C ., followed Brown v.
Higgs and held that the donee had a duty to execute the power .
The concept of trust powers employed in cases such as
Burrough v. Philcox is analogous to that discussed in Brown v.
Higgs and in cases on certainty of objects. In either case on the
construction of an instrument a conclusion is drawn that the
donee was intended to execute the power -to choose one or
more of the courses of action which were authorized by the
power . The power was intended to be exercised in that sense.
There is, however, an obvious and important limit to the analogy.
A donee who is not a trustee is under no enforceable duty to
"exercise" the power in either of the two senses which have been
discussed above. If he refuses to turn his mind to the exercise of
the power or if he states that he has no intention of exercising
43Ibid .,

at p. 271 (italics added) .

Supra, footnote 41 .
45 Op . Cit ., footnote 26, pp . 588-597; and see Gray, op . cit ., footnote
44

4, at p. 6.
46 (1840), 5 My . & Cr . 72 .
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it no object will ordinarily have any legal remedy while the power
continues in existence .47
(8) Where the donee is not a trustee: duty to consider
In some cases in which judges have spoken of a duty to
exercise a dispositive power when the donee was not a trustee it
is not clear whether they have been referring to a duty to execute
the power or merely a duty to consider whether it should be
executed : In other cases the second meaning has been emphasized. In Re Dunne's Trusts,48 for example, a testator directed
his executors to divide the residue of his estate among his children
in equal shares but empowered his widow at her discretion to
limit the entitlement of one son to a specified amount . The widow
was not a trustee of the property but was held to be a trustee of
the power which was described as a power coupled with a trust
or a duty . In reaching this conclusion it was stressed that the
power was a collateral power which was intended "to be exercised
by her up to the last moment of her existence" . 49 It followed, and
was held, that the donee's attempt to release the power was
ineffèctive .5° In this case as in the cases which concerned powers
which fall within the preceding category judges were prepared
to attach important consequences to the intention of the donor
notwithstanding the fact that the existence of the intention
imposed no enforceable obligation on the donee of the power.
The donee had no enforceable duty to exercise the power in any
sense but, because of the donor's intention that until her death
she should consider whether it was to be executed, she was
disabled from releasing it .
(9) Farwell's terminology

The influence of Farwell on Powers5 l in the more recent
cases has rivalled that of Sugden on Powers in the nineteenth
century. For this reason and because Farwell distinguished three
types of fiduciary powers the terminology employed in the work
must be mentioned. Farwell used the term "trust-power" to refer
to any power which was given to a trustee as "part of the
machinery of the trust" . 5z If this was intended to comprehend
both the administrative and dispositive powers of trustees a trustSee, infra, p . 257 .
Supra, footnote 25 .
49 (1878), L.R . 1 Ir . 516, at p . 523, per Chatterton V .C .
50 See, infra, p. 282 .
51 A Concise Treatise on Powers (3rd ed ., 1916) .
52 Ibid ., at p . 524 .
47
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power would appear to be one which is given to a trustee in his
capacity as such .
Perhaps the most potentially misleading term used in the
treatise is "a power in the nature of a trust" .s s Being of the
opinion that Re Weekes' Settlement 54 was wrongly decided,
Farwell ignored the implications of the reasoning of Romer 7., in
that case and used the term to refer to any power to select among
a class which was given to a person who was not a trustee and
which was not coupled with a gift in default of appointment in
favour of anyone other than the class. In this sense there would
be a power in the nature of a trust if there was no express gift
in default of the exercise of a power of selection or if there was
an express gift in default in favour of the objects. This usage of
the term appears to have caused some confusion in at least one
modern case.`,-7i
other of Farwell's terms which has immediate relevance
is "a power coupled with a duty". Although it is clear that Farwell
did not regard this type of power as the same as that which he
described as a power in the nature of a trust, the precise meaning
which he intended to convey is obscure. The term "power coupled
with a duty" was used to refer to those powers which remained
incapable of release after some of the restrictions on the release
of powers had been removed by statute. It seems that Farwell
did not intend to confine the term to powers which were vested
in trustees and it may be that he intended to refer to any power
which was given for the benefit of persons other than the donee
except "the ordinary power of appointment among children or
issue, given to a tenant for life in a settlement" .56

III . Significance of the Concept of Trust Powers .
(1) Enforcement by the court
a) Where the donee is a trustee

A large body of judicial dicta supports the proposition that
the court will enforce, and in certain circumstances will exercise,
trust powers but not bare powers .,,' It is clear that when state
ments to this effect have been made the concept of a trust power
- Ch . 12 of the Treatise is concerned with such powers .
-. 4 Supra, footnote 19 .
Re Wills' Trust Deeds, [1964] Ch . 219; infra, p. 282.
Op . cit ., footnote 51, p. 13 .
57 The proposition has been affirmed repeatedly during the last twentyfive years in the cases in which courts were concerned with the requirements of certainty of objects. In two of those cases it was accepted in
the House of Lords : see, infra, pp . 251-253 .
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has usually been that which was discussed by Lord Eldon in
Brown v. Higgs: the trustee has a duty to choose one of the
courses of action which are authorized by the power. The court
enforces the trust power by compelling the performance of that
duty.
The assertion that bare powers cannot be enforced by the
court is, of course, not inconsistent with judicial statements that
a trustee has a duty to exercise all of his discretions . Such state
ments employ the notion of exercising a discretion in the weaker
sense which has been referred to above."
Although it is axiomatic that a court will compel the
performance of a trustee's duties, including the duty which distinguishes a trust power from a bare power, the practical signif
icance of the distinction between trust powers and bare powers
in the context of enforcement appears now to be much less
than the emphasis it has received in the past would suggest. This
can be demonstrated by considering the different methods by
which a court can enforce trust powers in each of the situations
in which it will normally have the opportunity to do so .
When a court is called upon to enforce the exercise of a
trust power it will sometimes merely declare that the trustee is
under a duty to choose one of the courses of action which are
authorized by the power and leave the choice to the trustee. In
addition it might remove one or more of the trustees and appoint
new trustees . In some cases it will require that when the trustee
has reached a decision it must receive the sanction of the court.
®n occasion, the court will actually exercise the discretion itself
by indicating the appropriate course of action for the trustee
to take .
The selection of one or more of these methods is usually
required after an order for the administration of the trust has been
made, when the court has held a trustee to have been in breach
of trust or to have abused his discretion, or when, without any
allegation of a breach of trust, a beneficiary or a trustee has
applied to the court for advice and directions .
i) Administration by the court

The institution of an administration action does not prevent
a trustee from exercising his discretionary powers .59 Nor does the
sa Supra, p. 238.
59 Talbot v. Marshfield (1867), 4 L.R . Eq . 661, varied (1868), L.R.
3 Ch. App. 622.
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making of an administration order have such an effect6° From
the institution of such proceedings the court's supervisory jurisdiction is, however, more extensive than it was before that time.
There is authority which suggests that the degree of supervision
which the court will exercise after proceedings have been commenced varies considerably according to whether the power is a
trust power or a bare power. Thus in Tempest v. Lord Camoys
(No. 3)0l Jessel M.R., referred to the importance of the distinction : `'2
It is settled law that when a testator has given a pure discretion to
trustees as to the exercise of a power, the Court does not enforce the
exercise of the power against the wish of the trustees, but it does
prevent them from exercising it improperly . . . . But in all cases where
there is a trust or duty coupled with the power the court will then
compel the trustees to carry it out in a proper manner and within a
reasonable time .

Although the words of the Master of the Rolls have often been
cited with approval they call for some comments . In the first
place it is well established that while administration proceedings
are pending a trustee's administrative discretions must be exercised under the eye of the court."' If the trustee chooses to
perform one of the acts authorized by the power, the court will
"require of him the clearest evidence that he exercised the discretion bona fide and after the most mature investigation" . 64
After an administration order has been made any exercise of an
administrative power requires the sanction of the court."" These
rules are applicable to trust powers and bare powers alike." In
Bethel v. Abraham,'!' Jessel MR., stated that in his opinion the
court's sanction is not required for the exercise of dispositive
discretions."" Whether this statement represents the modern law
is uncertain. There were many cases in the early nineteenth
"Re Gadd (1883), 23 Ch .D . 134 ; Webb v . Earl of Shaftesbury
(1802), 7 Ves. 481 ; Tempest v. Lord Camoys (No . 3), supra, footnote 21 ;
Re McLaren (1921), 51 O.L .R. 538 .
61 Supra, footnote 21 .
6_ Ibid ., at p. 578 .
6% Talbot v . Marshfield, supra, footnote 59 ; A . G . v . Clack (1839),
1 Beav . 467 .
64 Ibid., at p. 670 .
( ; -,-)Re Furness, [1943] Ch . 415 ; Mirrors v . Battison (1876), 1 App .
Cas. 428, at p. 438 ; Re Gadd, supra, footnote 60 .
a's Talbot v . Marshfield, supra, footnote 59 concerned a bare power;
in Re Gadd, supra, footnote 60, there was, in effect, a trust power.
67 (1873), L.R . 17 Eq . 24 .
68 Ibid ., at p. 26 .
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century where the courts did much more than merely sanction the
exercise of dispositive discretions after an administration order
had been made .69 A reference to a Master in order to ascertain
the amounts that should be applied under a power of maintenance
was made in many cases. This practice was confined by some
judges to cases where the power was a trust power'° but by the
end of the century the increasing emphasis which was placed on.
the uncontrolled nature of a trustee's discretions appears to have
led to a retreat from even this position .71
There is, however, no modern decision that the court's
sanction is not needed for the exercise of a dispositive power after
an administration order has been made and there are dicta which
are inconsistent with those of the Master of the Rolls in Bethel
v. Abraham .72 In what appears to have been the most recent case
in which the necessity to obtain the sanction of the court was
discussed the rule was stated in quite general terms :
In my judgment, after an order for general administration has been
made, a trustee is not at liberty to sell, deal with or distribute the assets
of the testator's estate without obtaining the sanction of the court 73

If the distinction between trust powers and bare powers is
of no relevance to the rule which requires the sanction of the
court there is still the proposition that, even after, an administra
tion order has been made, the court will not force a trustee to
exercise his bare powers as distinct from his trust powers . If such
a rule exists it is clear that it is subject to exceptions . If a trustee's
failure to exercise a bare power amounts to an abuse of discretion
the court can exercise the discretion itself . This was done in Klug
v. Klug74 where one trustee refused to concur in the exercise of
cs E.g ., White v. Grane (1854), 18 Beav . 571 ; Re Sanderson's Trusts
(1857), 3 K . & J. 497; Ransome v. Burgess (1866), L.R . 3 Eq . 773;
Windham v. Copper (1871), 24 L.T. 793 ; Thorpe v. Owen (1843), 2 Hare
607; Hawkins, Exercise by Trustees of a Discretion (1967), 31 Conveyancer
and Property Lawyer (N .S .) 117.
7° See, for example, Thompson v. Griffin (1841), Cr . & Ph . 317 and
the discussion of Ransome v. Burgess, supra, footnote 69, in Wilson v.
Turner (1883), 22 Ch .D . 521.
71 In Tempest v. Lord Cainoys (No. 3), supra, footnote 21, and Re
Gadd, supra, footnote 60, Jessel M.R ., denied that the court would substitute its own discretion for that of the trustee even where a trust power
was administrative rather than dispositive in nature . The court would
strike down an attempt to exercise a power improperly but it would
not itself exercise the power.
72 Supra, footnote 67 .
73 Re Furness, supra, footnote 65, at p. 419; Talbot v. M'arshfield,
supra, footnote 59, was concerned with a dispositive power.
74 [1918] 2 Ch. 67 .

246

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[VOL. LIV

a bare power of advancement. Neville J., held that the refusal was
actuated by an improper motive and directed that an advancement
should be made.
Even where there is no suggestion that the trustee has abused
his discretion the court has sometimes exercised bare powers of
management . In Tempest v. Lord Camoys (No. 2)' 5 for example,
Lord Langdale M.R., overuled a trustee's refusal to exercise a
power to grant a lease of the trust property . Although the Master
of the Rolls is reported to have described the power as one
coupled with a duty, there is nothing in the note of the case which
would suggest that the instrument imposed a duty to let the
property ." On the contrary, the power was expressed to be exercisable at the absolute discretion of the trustees . Lord Langdale's
use of the trust power language would appear to amount to
nothing more than an assertion of the court's power to interfere.
An appeal from the decision was dismissed by Lord Cairns L.C.,
who described the power as nothing more than part of a general
scheme for the management of the estate and denied that the
court's jurisdiction in administering the -trusts of the will did not
extend to the exercise of the power.'?
Again, in Re Brotivn 7 s trustees had an "uncontrolled" discretionary power to choose, vary and transpose the investments
of the trust. Prior to the commencement of administration pro
ceedings the trustees made certain investments on behalf of the
trust. After the malting of an administration order Pearson J.,
directed that the investments should be sold while recognizing
that the trustees had not been guilty of a breach of trust .79

It is difficult to discern the principle which distinguishes the
powers in these cases from that in Tempest v. Lord Camoys (No.
3) 8° where the Court of Appeal refused to override one trustee's
refusal to invest money of the trust in the manner desired by the
other trustee. Clearly to describe powers of the former kind as
trust powers or powers coupled with a duty is to depart from the
concept of trust powers which was discussed in Brown v. Higgs
Supra, footnote 23 .
Cf., Mortimer v. Watts, supra, footnote 22, Nickisson v. Cockill,
supra, footnote 9.
77 Supra, footnote 23 .
78 (1885), 29 Ch .D . 889.
7 9 See, also, Butler v. Withers (1860), 4 L.T . 736.
"° Supra, footnote 21, This case involved a trust power in the traditional sense of the term : the trustee had a duty to invest with a discretion
as to the selection of investments .
75
76
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and is not helpful. In Re Courtier,sl Cotton and Brwen L.JJ.,
explained the distinction in terms similar to those employed by
Lord Cairns in Tempest v. Lord Camoys (No. 2) and held that
a power of sale was not part of a general trust for the management of the estate and was therefore one with which the court
would not interfere. The attributes which served to distinguish
the power from one which would be part of a general trust for
management were not disclosed.
It is possible that the cases in which the court exercised a
bare power in the course of its administration of a trust might be
dismissed as examples of an attitude which was more consistent
with those of judges in the earlier rather than the later part of the
nineteenth century. There is, however, very little which can be
said for a rigid application of Lord Eldon's distinction between
trust powers and bare powers after an administration order has
been made . If in such a situation the court will examine and can
quash a trustee's decision to exercise a bare power in a particular
way, why should its controlling jurisdiction not extend to the
trustee's decision not to exercise the power? It is suggested that
Re Brown and Tempest v. Lord Camoys (No. 2) illustrate that
the answer to the question has not been obvious to all judges .
It is clear, of course that a court would find It easier to
exercise some discretions than others and that, where a settlor
or testator has placed particular confidence in the personal judg
ment of the trustee he has selected, a court should be reluctant
to take the discretion out of his hands. Considerations of this kind
and of those of convenience and efficiency, rather than the trust
power - bare power distinction, would form a more satisfactory
basis for the court's power of intervention after an administration
order has been made .
ii) Breach of trust
Where a trustee's conduct with respect to his powers amounts
to a breach of trust there would appear to be few situations in
which the distinction between trust powers and bare powers is
likely to have any bearing on the court's exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction. If the breach of trust flows from the trustee's mistaken
opinion that his power is a bare power rather than a trust power,
a court might justify its interference in terms of the distinction .
Suppose, for example, the trustee has a duty to sell and to invest
si Supra, footnote 23 ; see, also Re Bryant, supra, footnote 23, at
p. 331.
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the proceeds with a limited discretionary power to select the
investments. If the trustee retains the original property in the
belief that there was no duty to sell, the court's intervention might
be described as based on its jurisdiction to enforce trust powers
as distinguished from bare powers . A simpler and a more helpful
statement would be that the court will always compel a trustee
to perform the duties which the settlor has imposed upon him.
Emphasis on the distinction in such cases can be misleading
because, in most other cases where a trustee's conduct with respect
to his powers amounts to a breach of trust, the ability of the court
to interfere and the available sanctions appear to be in no way
affected by the distinction between trust powers and bare powers .
In some cases a decision that the trustee has committed a
breach of trust involves a conclusion that in the circumstances
there was only one course of action which the trustee could
lawfully take. This will be the position where, for example, the
court holds that, despite the existence of a power to retain original
assets for such period as the trustee should think fit, the trustee
is liable for failing to sell the property . The intervention of the
court might be justified on the ground that the trustee did not
turn his mind to the exercise of his discretion, that he took irrelevant matters into account, that he acted in order to achieve an
improper purpose, that he acted imprudently or that he failed to
hold an even-hand between different beneficiaries. Whatever the
ground, the classification of the power as a bare power or a trust
power would be of no significance . In Fales, Wohlleben et al . v.
Canada Permanent Trust Co .,`2 trustees were removed and held
to be liable for the injury caused to an estate by their imprudent
exercise of a bare power of retention. In Re Smiths3 trustees were
removed for failing to hold an even-hand between life tenant and
remainderman when they failed to sell property under a trust
power to sell or retain .'} In cases of this kind whether one
describes the court's action as overriding the discretion of the
trustees, or as denying the existence of the discretion in the
particular circumstances, it is clear that the court has in effect
exercised the discretion in both the weal: and the strong sense
and has attached liability to the trustee for failing to act in
precisely the same manner.
[19741 3 W.W .R . 84, rev'd, in part, [l975] 3 W.W.R . 400.
83 11971) 1 O.R. 584, varied, [1971] 2 O.R. 541.
3} See, also, Re Nicholls (1913), 29 O.L .R . 206; Partridge v. Equity
Trustees Executors and Agency Co . Ltd (1947), 75 C.L.R . 149; Elder's
Trustee & Executor Co . Ltd v. Higgins (1962), 113 C.L .R. 426.
bz
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In other cases where a trustee's conduct with respect to his
discretions has been held to amount to a breach of trust ' the
court's decision will not involve a conclusion that only one course
of action was available to the trustee. The court might simply
annul the trustee's choice of one of the actions which were authorized by the power or it might declare that the trustee's inaction
was not properly motivated. In some such cases the court might
remove the trustees and replace them with new trustees . In others
it might simply instruct the trustees as to the matters relevant to
the discretion and order them to turn their minds to its exercise
in the future . In still other cases the court might take it upon itself
to exercise the discretion by choosing one or more "of the courses
of action which were authorized by the power. It does not appear
that the selection of the appropriate method of enforcement will
be affected significantly by the classification of the power as a
trust power or as a bare power.
Thus, in Re Rutler,85 where executors were directed to pay
such sum or sums as in their sole and absolute discretion they
might deem necessary and proper for the maintenance of a
beneficiary, LeBel J., held that the trustees had not turned their
minds to the proper exercise of their discretion and directed them
to do so . He appears to have construed the instrument as conferring a trust power: a duty to provide for maintenance with a
discretion only as to quantum. The power of the court to exercise
the discretion if the trustees failed to do so in the future was
recognized .86

In Re Sayers et al. and Philip 87 the question concerned a
statutory bare power given to a trustee to apply income for the
maintenance or education of infants for whom he was holding
property in trust. A request for maintenance having been unsuccessful, the guardians of the infants applied to the court. The
Court, of Appeal of Saskatchewan agreed with the judge at first
instance that there had been no "real exercise of discretion" by
the trustee and that the court was therefore in a position to take
upon itself the exercise of the discretionary power. It was held
that amounts should be applied for maintenance and the -amounts
which were appropriate in the existing circumstances were determined by the court. The court recognized the continued existence
of the trustees' discretionary power. to vary the amounts if the
circumstances of the infants changed.$$
[19511 O.W .N . 670.
se Ibid ., at p. 673 .
87 (1973), 38 D.L .F. (3d) 602.
88 See, also, Re Wise, [1896] 1 Oh . 281, at p. 286.
85
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It might be argued that these cases on powers of maintenance
do not support any general rule that the court has a residual jurisdiction to exercise discretionary powers but that they merely
reflect a continuation of the control which courts exercised over
powers of maintenance in the nineteenth century. Even if such
an argument were accepted it would not give any additional
significance to the distinction between trust powers and bare
powers . There is, however, no modern authority which suggests
that powers of maintenance are to be regarded as in a special
position as far as the court's controlling jurisdiction is concerned. 89
Nor would there appear to be any sound reason why the court's
jurisdiction to remedy a breach of trust should vary according
to whether an administration order has been asked for. There is
nothing in the brief judgment of Neville J., in Klug v. Klug99 nor
in the notes of counsel's arguments which would suggest that the
existence of the administration order was regarded as crucial or
even as relevant to the decision in that case . 91
The true position, it is suggested, is that the court will be
very reluctant to take upon itself the function of making the
choice authorized by a discretionary power when the trustee is
in breach unless, of course, it is of the opinion that in the circumstances only one course of action could lawfully be taken . In the
great majority of cases it will either remove the trustee and
replace him with another or merely direct the trustee to turn his
mind to the exercise of his discretion and to consider all relevant
matters. Cases like Re Butler9:` and Re Sayers et al. and Philip93
support the view that the court has, however, a residual jurisdiction to exercise the discretionary power if it deems it desirable
or expedient to do so . Although the court will always enforce the
duty to make a choice which is inherent in a trust power, the cases
do not support the proposition that it is more likely to make the
choice itself than it would be in the case of a bare power. Except
in the case where the trustee's breach of trust arises from his
denial of the existence of the duty, the distinction between the two
types of powers appears to have no significance for the question
89 Any such suggestion would seem to be inconsistent with Gisborne
v. Gisborne (1877), 2 App. Cas. 300 which is still the leading case on
the "uncontrollable" discretions of trustees . See Cullity, op . cit., footnote 7.
9o Supra, footnote 74 .
91 But see Craig v. National Trustees Executors and Agency Co .,
[1920] V.L .R . 569.
92 Supra, footnote 85 .
93 Supra, footnote 87 .
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of the ability of the court to intervene and the method of its
intervention .
iii) Failure to exercise a dispositive power
In recent years references to the court's jurisdiction to
exercise trust powers have been most frequent in cases concerning
the requirement that the objects of a trust should be described
with certainty. In Re Gulbenkian's Settlements" Lord Upjohn
emphasized the significance - of the distinction between trust
powers and bare powers for this purpose : 95
Again the basic difference between a mere power and a trust power
is that in the first case trustees owe no duty to exercise it and the
relevant fund or income fails to be dealt with in accordance with the
trusts in default of its exercise, whereas in the second case the trustees
must exercise the power and in default the court will .
It seems highly improbable that in his reference to an exercise of
the power by the court, Lord Upjohn intended to suggest that a
court would do anything other than compel an exercise of the
power by the original trustee or by a substitute or order the
property to be distributed among the objects in equal shares .
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century it had been
recognized .that the court would not take upon itself the exercise
of the discretionary element in a power of appointment over
capital. Lord St . Leonards devoted little space to the seventeenth
and eighteenth century authorities to the contrary :9s
But these cases are not now law. The trustees' discretion was not only
taken away, but the Court itself executed the power. Such a power is
now disclaimed . The Court never exercises a discretionary power.
While this was the -accepted practice it mattered little whether
the court was to be regarded as exercising the power or implying
a gift in default of its exercise. Until the decision in Re Weekes'
Settlement 97 the court would almost invariably order an equal
distribution in favour of the objects of a power unless the instrument contained a gift in default of appointment. This was so
whether or not the words of the instrument revealed the donor's
intention that the power was to be exercised. The consequences
of that decision and its acceptance in later cases are considered
[19701 A.C . 508.
9 5Ibid., at p. 525.
9E Op . cit., footnote 26, p. 601.
97 Supra, footnote 19 .

94
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below" where it is suggested that the traditional distinction
between trust powers and bare powers does not provide an
accurate test for predicting the circumstances in which the courts
will order a distribution of property to objects in default of the
exercise of a dispositive power .
Greater significance was, however, attributed to the distinction in the reasoning of the majority of the House of Lords in
Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No . 1) .59 While in terms adopting and
amplifying Lord Upjohn's statement of the effect of the distinction,
Lord Wilberforce affirmed the existence of "the principle that a
discretionary trust can in a suitable case, be executed according
to its merits and otherwise than by equal division" .loo The court
would, he said, execute a trust power in the manner best calculated
to give effect to the donor's intentions . This might involve the
appointment of new trustees, a direction that representative beneficiaries should prepare a scheme of distribution or even a direction that the property should be distributed in a particular
manner . 101
It is still too early to estimate the practical effect that this
reasoning will have on judicial attitudes towards the enforcement
of dispositive powers . On the whole it seems unlikely that courts
will now adopt a regular practice of exercising the discretion
inherent in a trust power. The enlarged jurisdiction is based on
the supposition that a trustee has, for some reason failed to exercise a trust power. Whether or not such an omission amounts to
a breach of trust it would seem likely that courts will not normally
find it necessary or appropriate to exercise the power as distinct
from compelling its exercise . If a trustee dies before exercising a
trust power or culpably fails to exercise it, the most appropriate
solution will usually be for the court to appoint a new trustee.
This, of course, has been the practice with respect to both administrative and dispositive powers where the power was conferred
upon a trustee in his capacity as such. If it continues to be the
practice, Lord Wilberforce's assertion of a jurisdiction to exercise
trust powers will have significance primarily as a major step in the
reasoning which led the House of Lords to relax the requirements
of certainty for the objects of a discretionary trust. When viewed
against the background of the modern cases in which judges have
claimed an ultimate jurisdiction to exercise both trust powers and
At pp .
Supra,
1 0 0 Ibid .,
101Ibid.,
98
99

260-264.
footnote 20.
at p . 452 .
at p . 457 .
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bare powers, there is nothing very startling about the statement
that the courts can, in a suitable case, execute a discretionary trust
by a method other than equal division .
One situation in which the reasoning and the conclusion of
the House of Lords may give ,rise to difficulty is where a trust
power has been conferred upon a trustee nominatim. Consider,
for example, a residuary bequest of property to a surviving spouse
on trust for the spouse for life with remainder to such of a class as
he or she should appoint. If the spouse dies without exercising
the power it will on orthodox principles be presumed to be
intended not to survive102 and the court will not appoint a substitute trustee. Before the decision of the House of Lords the court
would order the property to be distributed among the class in
equal shares. If the entire membership of the class could not be
ascertained such a distribution could not be effected and there
would be an intestacy with respect to the remainder interest .
After the decision of the House of Lords it would seem that,
notwithstanding the inappropriateness of the solution, a court
would have no option but to exercise the discretion itself .
iv) Applications for advice and directions
In the absence of an administration order or of any breach
of duty or abuse of discretion by a trustee, the court will not
normally indicate which of the actions authorized by a discretion
ary power should be performed. Since the decision of the House
of Lords in Gisborne v. Gisborne 103 and irrespective of the
classification of the power as a trust power or a bare power, a
beneficiary who has asked the court to exercise a discretion in
this way has almost invariably been met with the response that
in the absence of mala fides the rule of the court is not to
interfere.
!?e D'Epinoix's Settlement104 appears to be the only reported
decision in this century which suggests that the rule is not
inviolable when the trustee refuses to surrender his discretion
to the court. In that case trustees had refused to exercise a bare
power to vary investments they had chosen at an earlier date . ®n
a summons for advice and directions Warrington J., stressed that
there was no allegation of breach of trust but decided that he had
jurisdiction to direct inquiries for the purpose of determining
102
103
104

Infra, at pp . 285-287 .
Supra, footnote 89 .
[19141 1 Ch. 890 .
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whether the investments should be sold. The judge's reasoning is
interesting. The summons had asked the court to order the trusts
of the settlement to be executed to the extent that the court
thought it necessary. Warrington J., reasoned that as he had
jurisdiction to make an administration order and as he had no
doubt that he would then have power to order the enquiries, he
was satisfied that he could direct inquiries without ordering
administration. There is obviously much force in his reasoning.
The issue was very similar to that in Re Brown'" and it is
difficult to see why the making of a limited administration order
on an application by originating summons should have any significant effect on the court's supervisory jurisdiction . 19 s
It is suggested that Re D'Epinoix's Settlement illustrates
again that it can be misleading to speak in terms of the court's
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction to exercise the discretionary
powers of trustees . The court itself has a discretion to intervene
even where there is no allegation of a breach of trust. It will be
very reluctant to do so but on facts similar to those before
Warrington J., the intervention would appear to be justified.

The significance of the decision is perhaps greater in England
than in Canada . It is possible to argue that Canadian courts have
shown themselves to be more ready to interfere with the discre
tions of trustees than have the courts in England. 107 On the facts
of Re D'Epinoix's Settlement it is quite possible that a Canadian
court would have found the trustees to have been in breach of
trust and would have justified its intervention on that ground . 1 ° 8
Even where the application to the court has been made by
one or more of the trustees, the reported cases suggest that Canadian courts have usually refused to indicate which of the actions
authorized by the power should be chosen . 1 °9 A distinction has
Supra, footnote 78 .
In Underhill's Law of Trusts and Trustees (12th ed ., 1970),
p. 619 it is stated that it is quite common in England to couple with
an application for directions a claim for general administration so far
as should be necessary.
107 E.g  in the English cases more significance appears to have been
given to the draftsman's use of adjectives such as "absolute" and "uncontrollable" . See Cullity, op . cit., footnote 7, at pp. 112-113 ; cf., Waters, op . cit.,
footnote 18, pp . 664-665.
10S Trustees had refused to dispose of mortgages in the face of
evidence that the security was insufficient .
109 See, e.g., Re Boukydis (1927), 61 O.L .R . 561 ; Re Fulford (1913),
29 O.L .R. 375; Re Banko, [1958] O.R . 213 ; Re Davis, [1936] O.W .N . 146;
Re Collins (1927), 61 O.L .R. 225; Re Brown (1929), 35 O.W.N . 335;
Waters, op . cit., footnote 18, pp . 755-758.
105
106
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often been drawn between advice as to the construction of the
instrument and the scope of discretionary powers on the one
hand and advice as to the appropriate course of action to be taken
in the execution of such a power. 11 o
Where the question is directed at the scope of the discretion
the distinction will not always be easy to apply. The court will
normally tell trustees whether particular matters are relevant to
the exercise of the discretion and whether particular acts would
be within its ambit.1 l1 If, however, the question is tantamount to
a request that the court should indicate which of the authorized
actions should be performed, Canadian courts have in most
reported cases declined to provide an answer ."'
The reluctance of Canadian judges to assist trustees in this
way contrasts with the approach of Buckley J., in Re AllenMeyrick's Will Trusts . 113 Trustees in that case had asked whether
a discretionary bare power of maintenance could be surrendered
to the court. The judge held that this could not be done in
advance so as to free the trustees from the obligation of exercising
the discretion in the future.
But that does not mean that they are not entitled to come to the court
and say: "We are in doubt as to how we ought to exercise this discretion
in respect of a particular fund of income which we have now got in
hand, and in the particular circumstances which at present exist." It seems
to me to be immaterial whether, in approaching the court, they place
before the court a particular proposal as a basis for discussion . If they
desired to surrender their existing discretion in respect of existing funds
in relation to existing circumstances, I see no reason why they should
not be permitted to do so, or why the court should not, in the light
of the information placed before it by trustees, say what the court
considers to be the right thing to do in relation to that fund and to
those circumstances .114
Re Allen-Meyrick's Will Trusts was considered by Crockett
J., in Re Greenl 15 where trustees had asked whether a proposed
exercise of a bare power of advancement would be improper.
After at first expressing some doubt the judge decided that he
had jurisdiction to express an opinion as to the propriety as
distinct from the wisdom of the proposal . As a practical matter,
Re Fulford, ibid ., at p. 382; Re Banko, ibid ., at p. 217.
As, e.g ., in Re Floyd, [1961] O.R . 50, at p. 56 .
112 Cases cited, supra, footnote 109.
113 [1966] 1 All E.R: 740.
1147bid ., at p. 744.
115 [1972] V.R . 848; cf ., Re Powles, [1954] 1 All E.R . 516; Re
Moxon's Will Trusts, [1958] . 1 W.L .R. 165.
110
111
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if the court is prepared to advise trustees that an exercise of the
discretion in a particular way is within their powers and would
not constitute a breach of trust, the distinction drawn by Crockett
J., may be of little importance .
The reported Canadian cases do not appear to extend so far.
The courts have been prepared to settle questions of construction
and to tell trustees how far their discretion extends, but they have
generally declined to decide whether a particular exercise of the
discretion in the existing circumstances would be proper or improper . In view of the broad concept of an abuse of discretion
which is currently being applied in Canada, this reluctance to
assist trustees is difficult to justify. If the court is satisfied that
all the material facts have been placed before it, then whether
the power is a bare power or a trust power, there is much to be
said for the conclusion of Buckley J., in Re Allen-Meyrick's Will
Trusts at least where the trustees have made a bona fide attempt
to exercise the discretion and have been unable to agree. 11 s
In exceptional circumstances Canadian judges have been
prepared to exercise discretions of trustees . In Re Haasz" 7 trustees
could not agree as to the exercise of a discretion "to convert
into money all or any of my estate ; or to retain all or any of my
estate in the form of asset in which it may be at my death" . The
Court of Appeal of Ontario recognized that the power was a trust
power and ordered a sale of the property which was in issue. In
Re Fleming"s the question was whether trustees who were directors of a company should cause the company to use its undistributed income to redeem preference shares held by the trust or
alternatively to distribute it in the form of a cash dividend. The
second alternative would have benefited a life tenant at the
expense of remaindermen . Osler J., referred to the reluctance of
the court to relieve trustees from their responsibility to exercise
their discretions but held that the fact that the life tenant was
one of the trustees was sufficient to justify his intervention . A
redemption of the preference shares was ordered.lls
See, also, Re Ropner's Settlement Trusts, [1956] 3 All E.R . 332,
333 ; Pilkington v. I.R .C., [1964] A.C . 612, at p. 640; and Campbell
v. Campbell (1917), S.R . (N .S .W .) 229, at p. 233 where the ability of
116

at p.

trustees to surrender their discretions to the court appears to have been
accepted .
117 Supra, footnote 37 .
its [1973] 3 O .R . 588; Scane (1974), 1 Estates and Trusts Q. 105.
its Quaere whether it would have been a breach of trust if the trustees
had not sought the advice of the court and, in their capacity as directors,
had declared a cash dividend : see Scane, op . cit., ibid ., at p. 114 .
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From this review of the reported decisions, it appears that
the distinction between trust powers and bare powers has little, if
indeed it has any, bearing on judicial decisions to exercise or to
refrain from exercising the powers of trustees . A court will always
enforce the duty to choose one of the courses of actions which are
authorized by a trust power but it will normally do this by the
same methods as it uses to enforce the duty to consider the exercise of a bare power. However the power has been classified, it
has been only in the exceptional case that the court has made the
choice for the trustees .
b)

Where the donee is not a trustee

Although the terminology of fiduciary powers has been
extended to those which are vested in a person who is not a trustee
in the strict sense, the court's supervisory jurisdiction over such
powers is no greater than its jurisdiction with respect to any
power which a trust instrument confers upon such a person . For
the most part the ambit of the jurisdiction is .coincident with that
of the doctrine of a fraud on a power. The court can annul a
fraudulent execution of the power but it will not as a general
rule interfere if the trustee simply ignores the existence of the
power or refuses to consider whether it should be executed . The
court, it has been said, has no power to remove a donee of a
dispositive power who is not a trustee, 12 ° and no power to dispense
with the consent of a person whose participation is required for
the exercise of a power of advancement. 121 Despite such statements it must be at least doubtful whether a court would permit
the management and administration of a trust to be frustrated
by the failure of a donee of an administrative power to co-operate
with the trustees . In such a case it is possible that an application
to vary the trust so as to destroy the power would be successful
and there was at least one Canadian case in which a donee who
was not a trustee was divested of administrative power before
the enactment of the legislation which permits variations to be
made .
In Re Rogers, 122 Orde J.A ., relieved the trustees from a
duty to consult with and to be governed by the advice of a
specified person in all matters relating to a particular investment
of the estate . The person named had placed himself in a position
12'o
121
122

Re Park, [1932] 1 Ch . 580, at p. 582.
Re Forster's Settlement, [1942] Ch . 199.

(1928), 63 O .L.R . 180; cf., Re Hart's Will Trusts, [1943] 2 All

E .R . 557.
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where his personal interest conflicted with that of the trust and
it was held that his behaviour indicated that he had lost sight of
the fact that, as a quasi-trustee, his sole duty was to assist the
trustees. The judge had no doubt that he had jurisdiction to make
the order on an application for advice on directions :
He cannot surely have a status superior to that of a trustee, and if a
trustee is subject to be removed by the Court (as he can be on a
summary application) the Court is, I think, clothed with full authority
under Rule 600 to deal summarily with the question whether or not in
the circumstances the trustees are free to proceed with the administration and disposal of the assets in question without the consent or
interference of Mr . Beaton .1'23
(2) Implication of gifts in default of appointment
The principles which govern the implication of gifts in
default of the exercise of a power of appointment were debated
in many nineteenth century cases and were, of course, discussed
at some length in the treatises of Lord St. Leonards124 and Sir
George Farwell.i25 With the contributions of those influential
writers should be coupled the article by John Chipman Gray
which appeared in the Harvard Law Review in the early years
of this century."6 The more recent periodical writing 127 indicates
that if the principles are now less controversial and of less direct
practical significance they still retain some fascination . This no
doubt is in part attributable to the fact that it is no simple
intellectual exercise to reconcile or even, perhaps, to comprehend
all of the distinctions drawn in some of the important cases in
the nineteenth century . 128 It is also explicable in terms of the
influence which the reasoning in those cases continues to have
1=~ Ibid., at p . 183 .
Op. cit., footnote 26, pp. 588-597 .
125 0p. cit., footnote 51, Ch. 12.
1260p . cit ., footnote 4.
1'27 Unwin, Power or Trust Power (1962), 26 Conveyancer and
Property Lawyer (N.S.) 92; Hopkins, Certain Uncertainties of Trusts and
Powers, (1971] Cambr. L.J. 68.

128 One might ask, for example, whether judicial acceptance of the
reasoning of Romer J., in Re Weekes' Settlement, supra, footnote 19,
destroys the basis of the principles applied in Lambert v. Thwaites (1866),
L.R . 2 Eq . 151. See Gray, op . cit., footnote 4, at pp. 22-25 . Lambert v.
Thivaites has been accepted by some judges in this century: see, for
example, Re Creighton, [1950] 2 W.W .R . 529; Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd v.
Tindal (1940), 63 C.L .R. 232, at pp . 248-249, per Latham C.J .; Re
Llewellyn's Settlement, [1921] 2 Ch . 281, at p. 286. It was not followed
in Re Gilbert, [1948] 3 D.L.R . 27 ; and see the comment of Dixon J., in
Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd v. Tindal l supra, at p. 267.
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in other areas of the law relating to discretionary powers . The
purpose of the following comments is simply to indicate how an
indiscriminate use of the trust power terminology contributed to
the uncertainty which surrounded the question of implied gifts in
the nineteenth century and which has not entirely disappeared.
The starting point on this topic as on all of those which
concern fiduciary powers are the cases of Harding v. Glyn 129 and
Frown v. Higgs.13'0 In each of those cases a trustee had a duty to
select the beneficiaries of an estate from among a specified class.
There was thus an enforceable obligation to choose one of the
courses of actions which were authorized by the power. In Brown
v. Higgs the obligation was enforced by the court's order that the
property should be distributed among the class in equal shares.
The extension of the reasoning in Brown v. Higgs to cases
where the donee of the power was not a trustee required, of course,
a shift from emphasis on the existence of a legal duty to exercise
the power to emphasis on a moral obligation or, which amounts
to the same thing, on the donor's intention that the power should
be exercised. In the nineteenth century some judges were prepared
to make the extension and spoke of a duty to exercise a power
even where the donee was not a trustee. 131 Whereas, however, in
cases where the donee was a trustee an equal distribution among
the objects was sometimes explained in terms of an execution of
the power by the court and sometimes in terms of an implied gift,
the second explanation was invariably given when the donee was
not a trustee .132 This was so irrespective of whether the power was
described as one which the donee had a duty to exercise . 133
In his treatise on powers Lord St . Leonards seems to have
preferred the theory of implied gifts and the restriction of the
trust power terminology to powers which were given to trustees .
At the same time he recognized the significance which the exisSupra, footnote 2.
Supra, footnote 3.
131 See, e.g., Burrough v . Philcox, supra, footnote 46 ; Salusbury v .
Denton (1857), 3 K. & J. 529 ; and see Dixon J., in Perpetual Trustee
Co. Ltd v . Tindal, supra, footnote 128, at pp . 261-262.
132 See, e.g ., Birch v . Wade (1814), 3 Ves. & B . 198; Moore v .
Ffolliot (1887), 19 L.R . In 499; Brown v . Pocock (1833), 6 Sim. 257;
Re Caplin's Will (1865), 2 Dr . & Sm . 527.
129
130

133 In some of the cases it was said that a gift would be implied
because of the court's inability to exercise the trust power which had
been given to the donee : see the cases cited, supra, footnote 131. In
Penny v . Turner (1848), 2 Ph. 493 Lord Cmttenham explained his
earlier decision in Burrough v. Philcox on this ground .
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tence of the donor's intention that a power should be exercised
had for the question whether a gift to the objects should be
implied. 134 Towards the end of the nineteenth century it began
to appear that the different approaches reflected in the cases
might be dismissed as of no practical significance . In the absence
of an express gift in default of the exercise of a special power of
appointment there appeared to be a strong presumption in favour
of a gift to the objects . This position was reflected in Farwell's
treatise where the term "power in the nature of a trust" was used
compendiously to refer to all cases in which the objects of a
power were entitled equally in default of appointment. 135 These
cases included those in which there was an express gift to the
objects subject to a power of selection and exclusion, those in
which there was no express gift but there was an indication that
the donor intended the power to be exercised and those in which
there was simply a power to appoint among a class with neither
an express gift in default nor an indication of an intention that
the power should be exercised .
The reasoning of Romer J., in Re Weekes' Settlement13s was
inconsistent with Farwell's treatment of gifts in default of appointment. Romer J., denied the existence of any presumption in favour
of a gift in default to the objects : 137
In my opinion the cases shew . . . that you must find in the will an
indication that the testatrix did intend the class or some of the class to
take-intended in fact that the power should be regarded in the nature
of a trust-only a power of selection being given, as, for example,
a gift to A for life with a gift over to such of a class as A shall appoint .
Re Weekes' Settlement has received a considerable amount of
attention in subsequent cases and in textbooks and in periodical
articles. Farwell and Gray were emphatically of the opinion that
it had been wrongly decidedl3 s and Farwell's statement of the
law is supported by dicta in some later cases .139 In other cases the
decision in Re Weekes' Settlement has been followed140 while in
13.1 Op .
135 Op.

cit ., footnote 26, pp. 592-593 .
cit ., footnote 51, Ch . 12.
136 Supra, footnote 19.
137 Aid ., at p. 292 .
13s Farwell, op. cit., footnote 51, pp. 529-530; Gray, op. cit., footnote
4, pp. 13-18 .
139 R e Hughes, [1921] 2 Ch. 208, at p. 214 ; Re Scarisbrick's Will
Trusts, [1951] Ch. 622, at p. 635 ; cf ., Re Llewellyn's Settlement, supra,
footnote 128 .
140R e Combe, [1925] Ch. 210 ; Re Perowne, [1951] Ch. 785 ; Re
Ward, [1952] O.W.N. 1 ; Re Hall, [1899] 1 I.R. 308 ; cf ., Re Dowsley
(1958), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 560 .
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others judges have gone to some trouble to distinguish it . 141 The
views of Gray and Farwell have been referred to in the Nigh
Court of Australia but neither clear approval nor disapproval
has been indicated .142
As well as the doubt which has been cast on the validity of
the principles which were applied in the case there has been some
disagreement as to its correct interpretation.
®n one view Re Weekes' Settlement stands for the proposition
that there can be no gift to the objects in default of appointment
unless the instrument in effect makes a direct gift to the objects
subject to a power of selection in the donee. This appears to have
been the way in which Gray interpreted the decision?43 ®n the
occasions when counsel have attempted to base an argument on
this interpretation it has been rejected .144 In Re Lloyd, Rose
C.Y .H .C ., said :145

. . .I do not read either In re Weekes' Settlement or In re Combe as
authority for saying that when the intention to benefit the objects of the
power seems, as it does in this case seem to me, to be evidenced by
the words of the will, effect shall not be given to that intention unless
there are found in the will some direct words of gift to the objects
and the power itself is a mere power of selection of some or one of
them or a mere power of apportionment amongst them . In this latter
case-where there are direct words of gift to the objects of powerthere is no need for the court to draw any inference: the testator has
made the gift, and all that remains to be settled is the question of the
distribution of the property among the donees . The case, in which the
necessity for drawing an inference arises is the case in which the
testator has not made a direct gift ; and upon the authorities it is clear
that in a proper case the inference may be drawn.

Lewis Simes146 understood Romer J., to be using the term
"power in the nature of a trust" in the sense in which it has been
used in the modern cases on certainty of objects . On this view
the emphasis in construction would be placed on the presence or
141 Re Lloyd, [1938] O.R . 32 ; Re Gilbert, supra, footnote 128; Re
Braddock, [1947] S.A .S .R . 329; cf ., Re Catterns, [1932] N.Z .L .R. 1402;
Re Creighton, supra, footnote 128.
142 Perpetual Trustee Co . Ltd v. Tindal, supra, footnote 128, at p. 262,
per Dixon 7.; Lutheran Church of Australia v. Farmers' Co-operative
Executors and Trustees Ltd (1970), 44 A.L .b .R . 176, at p. 188 per
Windeyer 3.
143 Op. cit., supra, footnote 4, at p. 13 .
144 Re Lloyd, supra, footnote 141; Re Braddock, supra, footnote 141.
14 5Ibid., at p. 35 .
146 The Law of Future Interests (2nd ed . by Lewis M. Simes and
Allan F. Smith, 1956), s. 1033 .
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absence of imperative words which indicated that the donor
intended the power to be exercised . Such an interpretation receives
some support in the judgment. In a passage which precedes the
one quoted above Romer J., said :147
Now apart from the authorities, I should gather from the terms of the
will that it was a mere power that was conferred on the husband, and
not one coupied with a trust that he was bound to exercise .
Similarly in Re Combe148 in which the correctness of Re Weekes'
Settlement was accepted, Tomlin J., formulated the issue in terms
which might be understood to require the presence of words which
indicate that the donor had intended the power to be exercised .149
Simes stated that Re Combe "clearly lays down the rule that the
power must be imperative if the property is to go to the class on
failure of the donee to appoint" . 150 This it is suggested is an
unlikely interpretation of either of the decisions mentioned. In
those as in some earlier cases it seems that the duty to which the
judges referred was to be implied from any indication that the
donor intended to benefit some or all of the class and not merely
from the existence of imperative words which would impose no
enforceable obligation . This approach appears clearly in the
judgment of Lord Cottenham L.C ., in Burrough v. Philcox: 151
These and other cases shew that when there appears a general intention
in favour of a class, and a particular intention in favour of individuals
of a class to be selected by another person, and the particular intention
fails, from that selection not being made, the Court will carry into
effect the general intention in favour of the class. When such an intention appears, the case arises, as stated by Lord Eldon, in Brown v.
Higgs, of the power being so given as to make it the duty of the donee
to execute it ; . . . .
The correct interpretation of the reasoning of Romer J.,
appears to be that a court will not imply a gift in default of
appointment unless it finds in the instrument some indication that
the donor had a general intention to benefit the objects.152 The
difference between this interpretation and that which was advocated by Simes is simply that the preferred approach treats the
existence of imperative words as only one of a number of possible
Supra, footnote 19, at p. 292.
Supra, footnote 140.
149Ibid ., at p. 218.
150 Op . cit ., footnote 146, p. 503 .
151 Supra, footnote 131, at p. 92 .
1 .52 "The test is whether the settlor has demonstrated an intention to
benefit the class in any event" : Keeton and Sheridan, The Law of Trusts
(10th ed ., 1974), p. 15 .
147

148
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indications that a gift in default was intended . Despite its historical
development from the concept of a power in the nature of a trust
which was discussed by Lord Eldon in Brown v. Higgs, the trust
power in Re Weekes' Settlement is not limited to oases in which
the words of the instrument indicate that the donor intended to
impose upon the donee a duty to exercise the power. The difference is largely one of emphasis where the donee is not a trustee
as in that case such a duty would be unenforceable. Nonetheless
it may be crucial in cases such as Re Lloyd1 53 where the testatrix
merely empowered her husband to appoint among a specified
class.154 The reasoning in that case and in the English cases in
which Re Weekes' Settlement was followed suggests that the
question is to be approached in the same way as any other
question of construction . 155 If the reasonable assumption is that
the donor contemplated that some or all of the objects would
ultimately have the property, it is not necessary to look for express
words which indicate that the power was intended to be exercised
or that the donor had turned, his mind to the possibility that the
donee might fail to do so . A general intention or assumption that
the members of the class of objects and no one else would receive
the property will be sufficient .
®n this view the essential difference between the position
of Farwell and that of Romer J., is simply that the former supported a strong presumption in favour of an implied gift's while
the approach of the latter denies the existence of any such presumption . The court must be satisfied that the donor had the
requisite intention to benefit the class, but neither Re Weekes'
Settlement nor the later cases suggests that there is a strong
presumption against the existence of the intention1 57
If the above discussion is correct a continued use of the
trust power terminology in the context of implied gifts is likely to
be misleading unless it is recognized that the concept of a power in
the nature of a trust for this purpose is wider than that which has
been employed in many of the more recent cases involving powers .
153
154

Supra, footnote 141.
See, also, Perpetual Trustee Co . Ltd v . Tindal, supra, footnote 128,

where a majority of the High Court of Australia held that a gift to the
objects was to be implied but did not agree on the composition of the
class.
155 Re Combe, supra, footnote 140 ; Re Perowne, supra, footnote 140 .
156 Farwell recognized that the presumption could be rebutted : op. cit .,
footnote 51, p. 531 .
157 See the comments of Dixon J., in Perpetual Trustee Co . Ltd v.
Tindal, supra, footnote 128, at p. 262.
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The concept is essentially the same as that used by Farwell in that
it includes all cases in which the property will pass to the objects
if the power is not exercised.15 $ The effect of Re Weekes' Settlement was simply to limit slightly the range of such cases.
(3) Uncertainty of objects

Much has oeen written about recent developments in the law
relating to certainty of objects and it is not intended to review the
whole subject again.1°19 The general thrust of the decision of the
majority of the House of Lords in Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No.
1)16°
was to assimilate the rules of certainty for trust powers to
those which had been approved for bare powers two years earlier
in Re Gulbenkian's Settlements (No. 1).161 In either case the test
is now to be whether it "can be said with certainty that any given
individual is or is not a member of the class".161 Insofar as the
majority judgments in Baden (No. 1) reflected a distaste for subtle
technicalities and removed much of the significance which had
previously been given to the distinction between trust powers and
bare powers, the decision effected a welcome change in the law.
It did not, unfortunately, deprive the distinction of all its relevance
for questions of certainty.
At the end of his judgment Lord Wilberforce referred to a
possible exception to the general rule :163
There may be a third case where the meaning of the words used is
clear but the definition of beneficiaries is so hopelessly wide as not to
form "anything like a class" so that the trust is administratively unworkable or in Lord Eldon's words one that cannot be executed . . . . I hesitate
to give examples for they may prejudice future cases, but perhaps "all
the residents of Greater London" will serve.

The scope of the exception and the principle upon which it is
based have been considered in two more recent cases but not
1r,s "It is common usage to describe as a power in the nature of
a trust one which is conferred in such circumstances that if it is not
exercised the property subject to it passes to the objects in whose favour
it is created" : Re Braddock, supra, footnote 141, at p. 344, per Reed J.
159 See Hanbury's Modern Equity (9th ed ., 1969, Supplement 1971),
pp . 125-130; Hopkins, op . cit., footnote 127; Cohen, Certainly Uncertain:
The Discretionary Trust (1971), 24 Current Leg. Prob . 133.
16o Supra, footnote 20 .
161 Supra, footnote 94 .
161 Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No . 1), supra, footnote 20 . The test
itself lacks certainty. For three different interpretations, see Sachs, Megaw
and Stamp L.JJ., in Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No 2), [1973] Ch . 9 and for
a comment see Christine Davies (1972), 50 Can. Bar Rev. 539.
163Ibid ., at p. 457.
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defined with any great precision. If anything the question has
become more obscure since those decisions and that in Re Baden's
Deed Trusts (No. 2) .164 In that case Brightman J., at first
instance165 and Sachs and Megaw L.JJ ., in the Court of Appeal
were of the opinion'" that the same requirements of certainty
were to be applied to trust powers and bare powers alike. If the
statements to that effect were correct it would appear that either
the exception mentioned by Lord Wilberforce applies to both
types of powers or that it does not exist. 167

In Rlausten v. I .R .C., 168 a discretionary trust with respect to
income had been created for the benefit of a specified class. Under
the trust deed trustees were given a bare power to add to the
class any person other than X. The power could only be exercised
with X's previous consent in writing. It was argued, inter alia,
that a bare power in such terms was void for uncertainty of
objects . Although the case was disposed of in the Court of Appeal
on other grounds, Buckley L.J., with whose judgment Orr L.J.,
agreed, expressed the opinion that the power was valid . After
stating that the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in
Baden (No. 1) was that "questions of validity depend on the
same or similar tests whether the provision under consideration
is a power or a trust", 169 Buckley L.J., concluded that the class
was not "so wide or so indefinite that the trustees would not be
able rationally to exercise the power" . 170 Although his Lordship
referred to the passage in Lord Wilberforce's judgment in which
the necessity that the beneficiaries should constitute a class was
emphasized, the test he applied was that derived from the judgment of Clauson J., in Re Park . 171
If the class of persons to whose possible claims they would have to
give consideration were so wide that it really did not amount to a class in
any true sense at all no doubt that would be a duty which it would be
impossible for them to perform and the power could be said to be
invalid on that ground. But here, although they may introduce to the
specified class any other person or persons except the settlor, the power
is one which can only be exercised with the previous consent in writing
of the settlor and, perhaps I may say in parenthesis, in my judgment
164
165
166
167

Supra, footnote 162.

[1972] Ch. 607, at p. 623 .

Supra, footnote 162, at p. 18, per Sachs L.J., at p. 23, per Megaw L.J.
In Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No. 1), supra, footnote 20, at p. 456

Lord Wilberforce said that the test for the validity of trust powers should
be "similar" to that which had been approved for bare powers.
168 [1972] Ch. 256 .
1659 Ibid., at p. 271 .
170Ibid,, at p. 273 .
171 Supra, footnote 120.
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could only be exercised in the lifetime of the settlor. Therefore on
analysis the power is not a power to introduce anyone in the world to
the specified class, but only anyone proposed by the trustees and
approved by the settlor. This is not the case in which it could be said
that the settlor in this respect has not set any metes and bounds to the
beneficial interests which he intended to create or permit to be created
under this settlement .17a
It does not appear whether the conclusion would have been the
same had the relevant clause contained a trust power and not a
bare power .
Essentially the same question arose on similar facts in Re
Manisty's Settlement.'" Under a settlement similar to that considered in Blausten, the trustees had power to declare that "any
person or persons, corporation or corporations, or charity or
charities" other than specified persons should thenceforth be
included in the class of beneficiaries . On an originating summons
brought by the trustees it was held by Templeman J., that the
power was not void for uncertainty . The learned judge was of
the opinion that there was no distinction to be drawn between
bare powers and trust powers as far as the principles governing
certainty of objects were concerned . He deduced from the statements of principle and the width of the powers considered in
Re Gestetner Settlement, 174 Re Gulbenkian's Settlements (No .
1)17 ., Baden (No. 1)176 and Baden (No . 2)177 that a power cannot
be uncertain merely because it is wide in ambit. He considered
further an argument based on Lord Wilberforce's insistence on
the necessity for a class and rejected it. In a most interesting part
of the judgment he denied that the width of the kind of "intermediate" power with which he was concerned imposed special
difficulties upon trustees in the exercise of their duty to consider
and to survey the field . Such difficulties he declared were no
different in kind and insignificantly different in degree than
those which confronted the donees of a special power of the
width of that in Gestetner .17 s The learned judge was not prepared
Blausten v. I.R.C., supra, footnote 168, at p. 272,
[1974] Ch. 17.
17 .1 [19531 Ch. 672 .
175 Supra, footnote 94 .
176 Supra, footnote 20.
177 Supra, footnote 162.
178 The class in Re Gestetner Settlement,
supra, footnote 174,
included named individuals, their living and future descendants, the widow
or widowers of the individuals and the descendants, specified charities,
ex-employees of the settlor or his wife, the present and future employees
172
17s
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to accept any implication in the judgment of Buckley L.J., in
lausten that the power in that case would have been void had
the consent of -a particular person not been required. Lord
Wilberforce's reference to the necessity that there be a class of
beneficiaries was explained on the ground that a power exercisable in favour of the residents of Greater )London would be
capricious as the membership would be "accidental and irrelevant
to any settled purpose or to any method of limiting or selecting
beneficiaries" . 179
While the judgment represents a valiant attempt to deal with
the difficulties which arise from the decision and the reasoning of
Lord Wilberforce in Baden (No . I) it is not evident that "caprice"
was the vice at which Lord Wilberforce's dictum was directed.
Nor does the notion of caprice introduce much clarity into an
already murky subject.
A power to benefit "residents of Greater London" is capricious because
the terms of the power negative any sensible interpretation on the part
of the settlor . If the settlor intended and expected the trustees would
have regard to persons with some claim on his bounty or some interest
in an institution favoured by the settlor or if the settlor had any other
sensible intention or expectation, he would not have required the trustees
to consider only an accidental conglomeration of persons who have no
discernible link with the settlor or with any institution . A capricious
power negatives a sensible consideration by the trustees of the exercise
of the power . But a wide power, be it special or intermediate, does not
negative or prohibit a sensible approach by the trustees to the consideration and exercise of their powers .lso
If a power to appoint to any person other than X is valid,
it is difficult to see why a settlor's attempt to confer benefits on
the residents of a specified area should be regarded as negativing
any sensible intention on his part and any sensible consideration
of the objects by the donees of the power. Administrative unworkability arising from the width of the definition rather than caprice
appears to have been the vice at which Lord Wilberforce's
comments were directed.
Apart from the difficulty of predicting whether a court would
hold that the objects referred to in any particular instrument do
not form "anything like a class" there is also some doubt whether
the exception applies to bare powers as well as to trust powers
and directors of a named company and their spouses and the present and
future employees or directors of any company that shared a director
with the named company and the spouses of such persons.
179 Supra, footnote 173, at p. 29 .
lso Ibid ., at p. 27.
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and whether it is confined to powers which have been given to
trustees.
In Re Manisty's Settlement Templeman J., inclined to the
view that the requirement of a class applied only "to trusts which
may have to be executed and administered by court and not to
powers where the court has a very much more limited function". 131 It is to be hoped that this view will be followed and it is
suggested that, given the existence of Lord Wilberforce's exception, it is only on this ground that the decision in Re Manisty's
Settlement can be supported . 182
Whether the exception applies to powers which are given to
persons who are not trustees depends in the first place upon
whether anything in Lord Wilberforce's judgment was intended
to apply to such powers. Despite the extension of the trust power
terminology to the powers of persons other than trustees there
appear to be no cases in which the pre-Baden rules of certainty
were held to determine the validity of such powers. If, indeed,
the correct analysis of cases such as Burrough v. Philcoxl 8a is
that the court was executing the "trust" imposed upon the donee
rather than implying a gift in default there would be some logic
in applying the same rules of certainty to all trust powers regardless of whether the donee was a trustee. If, however, the correct
view is that in such cases the court found an implied gift in equal
shares from the words of the instrumentl$4 equality will
presumably continue to be the rule. There would, however, be
no reason why the invalidity of the implied gift in default should
affect the validity of the power .
The principles which govern gifts in default of appointment
have not received much consideration in the cases in which it
has been argued that a power given to a person who was not a
trustee was invalid for uncertainty of objects . They were not
mentioned in Re Park"'-' in which Clauson J., upheld a power
1 81Ibid ., at p. 29.
1,92 If the requirement that the objects should constitute a class applies
to bare powers it would seem that Re Park, supra, footnote 120 and
Re Jones, [1945] 1 Ch . 105 were wrongly decided. The correctness of
these decisions has been doubted in Australia (see, infra, at p. 278), but
Re Park seems to have received the approval of Lord Upjohn in Re
Gulbenkian's Settlements (No. I), supra, footnote 94, at p. 521 . Similar
powers were treated as valid in Re Eyre, supra, footnote 25 and Re
Abraham's Will Trusts, [1969] 1 Ch. 463 .
ls3 Supra, footnote 131 .
184 Supra, p. 262.
185 Supra, footnote 120.
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to select the beneficiaries of income from any charitable institution or person other than the donee. The fact that the donee was
not a trustee was emphasized by the judge but he did not say
that the strictor rules of certainty which were applicable to the
trust powers of trustees would never be applied to donees who
were not trustees . 186 In Re Jones 187 where the residue of an
estate was given in trust for such persons living at the death of
the donee as the donee should by will appoint, the power was
upheld without any reference to the presence or absence of an
express gift in default of appointment. 188 If there was no such
gift the power would appear to have been a trust power and the
case would be some authority for the proposition that the trust
powers of persons other than trustees are not subject to the rules
of certainty which govern the trust powers of trustees . These
cases were decided before the significance of the distinction
between trust powers and bare powers for the purposes of
certainty had been clearly defined.- 89
In Re Gestetner Settlement,'" the decision which began the
line of cases which were considered in Baden (No. 1) Harman J.,
distinguished between powers which trustees were bound to exer
cise and "a power collateral, or a power appurtenant, or any of
those powers which do not impose a trust upon the conscience
of the donee . . ." .191 The introduction of the old classification of
powers into those which were appurtenant, in gross or simply
collateral was unfortunate and makes it very difficult to determine
whether the judge was referring to legally or morally enforceable
duties . The use of the term "power collateral" to refer to a power
which a donee was under no duty to exercise was most unusual
as in the earlier cases the term was often applied to powers which
2
were coupled with a duty in some sense.ls The terminology
18E In Re Gulbenkian's Settlements (No. 1), supra, footnote 94, at
p. 521, Lord Upjohn said that the existence of a gift in default of
appointment was fundamental to the decision in Re Park-.
187 Supra, footnote 182 .
18S The reports do not indicate whether the instrument contained
such a gift .
189 Although there were many earlier cases in which trusts were held
to fail on the ground of uncertainty of objects there was no attempt
to provide a precise description of the requisite certainty until the decision
of Harman J., in Re Gestetner Settlement, supra, footnote 174.
190 Supra, footnote 174.
191Ibid ., at p. 684.
392 As, e.g ., in Re Dunne's Trusts, supra, footnote 25 . In Re Mills,
[1930] 1 Ch . 654, at p. 668, Lawrence L.J ., described a power collateral
as "the most common form of power coupled with a duty".
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employed in Re Gestetner Settlement was adopted by Roxburgh
J., in Re Coates 193 and again it does not appear whether the
concept of a power coupled with a duty was thought to be
confined to powers which are held by trustees. There is a similar
obscurity in the later cases in which the term "power collateral"
was used to refer to powers which were not coupled with a
duty ."" As in most of these cases the courts were concerned with
powers which had been given to trustees, the failure to deal with
the question is understandable. In Re Gulbenkian's Settlements
(No. 1)19 Lord Upjohn distinguished between the trust powers
of trustees and the bare powers of "trustees or others" but did
not indicate whether he thought that for the purposes of certainty
all powers given to persons other than trustees would be classified
as bare powers .

If it is correct that there is as yet no clear authority196 for
the proposition that the rules of certainty which apply to the trust
powers of trustees are also applicable to the trust powers of
persons other than trustees, it is to be hoped that courts will not
find it necessary to accept that proposition in future cases. Quite
apart from the difficulty in applying Lord Wilberforce's requirement that the objects must constitute a class of some kind,
assimilation of all trust powers for the purposes of certainty
would create practical problems of enforcement where the donee
was not a trustee. Unless the court was prepared to assert a
jurisdiction to remove such a personl~'7 it could be called upon
to exercise a trust power to select the beneficiaries of income in
every year. There would appear to be no method by which the
court could force the donee even to turn his rnind to the existence
of the power.
A more fundamental objection to the assimilation of the
trust powers of trustees and others for the purposes of certainty,
is the quite unsatisfactory nature of the distinction between trust
powers and bare powers where the donee is not a trustee. Consider two cases : In the first the donee is directed to appoint
119551 1 Ch . 495.
See, for example, Re Gulbenkian's Settlements (No. 1), [19681 Ch .
126, at p. 133, per Lord Denning M.R .; Re Sayer, [1957] Ch . 423, at
p. 431, per Upjohn J.
19 Supra, footnote 94 .
196 Lord Upjohn's comment on Re Park, supra, footnote 186, may
have been intended to suggest that the rules of certainty which applied
to the trust powers of trustees were also to be applied to powers which
persons who were not trustees were intended to exercise .
197 Supra, pp . 257-258.
1~a
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capital or income to such of a class as he should think fit with
an express gift in default to the class in equal shares ; in the
second case the provision is the same except that there is no
express gift in default. The orthodox doctrine is that, while the
second power would normally be construed as a trust power,
the existence of an express gift in default indicates that the first
power should not be so construed. The distinction makes no .
sense at all. If the basic question is whether the donor intended
a selection to be made the presence or absence of an express
gift over to the class should not be decisive . The express gift
might indicate merely that the donor recognized that the donee
could not be forced to exercise the power and that for any of a
number of reasons he might not do so .
If the presence or absence of an express gift to the class
in default of appointment cannot be decisive, a court considering
a power of the first kind would have to estimate the relevant
significance of the imperative words and the existence of the
express gift in default. The task could be extraordinarily difficult
and it is submitted that to require the court to embark upon it
would be to attribute excessive importance to the possible presence
of an unenforceable moral obligation . It is suggested that if the
class is uncertain, in each of the two hypothetical cases mentioned,
the express gift in default in the first case and the implied gift
in the second should be void, but the power in each case should
remain valid and exercisable . The existence of imperative words
can be regarded as an important factor in the search for an
implied gift in the second case but as those words impose no
legal obligation their existence should not affect the validity of
the power and the definition of the applicable rules of certainty.
The decision in Baden (No . 1)19 $ is clearly inconsistent with
any suggestion that a similar approach could be taken to the trust
powers of trustees . The courts will not imply a gift in default of
the exercise of such a power. By one method or another they
will ensure that the power is exercised and if the above submissions are correct, the requirement that the objects should
constitute a class of some kind is one respect in which the
distinction between trust powers and bare powers remains important . For at least two reasons this is to be regretted. In the first
place the requirement is of most uncertain scope and must
inevitably be productive of litigation. The second reason is simply
198

Supra, footnote 20.
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that it is inconsistent with the same considerations of policy which
led the House of Lords to repudiate a rule which would require
that all the beneficiaries of trust powers should be ascertainable .
When applied to particular instruments the distinction between
trust powers and bare powers can be extraordinarily narrow and
artificial and as Lord Wilberforce said : 190
It does not seem satisfactory that the entire validity of a disposition
should depend upon such delicate shading .

Consider two cases: In one the instrument directs the
trustees to distribute income among such of A, B, and C as they
should select and in a separate clause gives them power to add
to the class any person other than themselves ; in the other case,
the instrument simply directs the trustees to distribute income
among such of A, B and C and any other person other than
themselves as they should select. The decisions in Blausten v .
IS .C.2°" and Re Manisty's Settlement201 indicate that the power
to add persons in the first case would be a bare power. The power
in the second case would appear to be a trust power and to be
invalid if there is any substance in the requirement that the beneficiaries should constitute a class of some kind . An attempt to
justify such a result on the ground that in the second case "a
wider and more comprehensive range of inquiry is called for" 202
than in the first would surely represent the ultimate in technicality .203
If the existence of the requirement of a class for trust powers
is unfortunate it is still possible to appreciate why it was thought
necessary to give it some recognition in Baden (No . 1) . A com
plete assimilation of the rules of certainty for the trust powers
and bare powers of trustees would have required the repudiation
of cases in which it had been held that trust powers in favour of
such persons other than the trustees as the trustees should select
are invalid.04 While there is some authority for the proposition

Iss Ibid., at p . 449 .
Supra, footnote 168 .
201
Supra, footnote 173 .
2102 Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No . 1), supra,
200

footnote 20, at p . 457 .
"But the client must not be penalized for his lawyer's slovenly
drafting" : Re Gulbenkian's Settlements (No . 1), supra, footnote 94, at
p . 517, per Lord Reid .
='0} Yeap Cheo Neo v. Ong Cheng Neo (l875), 6 P .C. 381, Stubbs v.
Sargon (1838), 3 My . & Cr . 507 ; cf ., Re Booth (1917), 86 L.J . Ch . 270.
2203
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that bare powers of this type are valid205 the courts have in this
area as in others consistently refused to treat invalid trusts as
valid powers . 206 The most they have been prepared to do is to
treat the size and indefinite nature of the range of objects as one
factor to be considered in determining whether the settlor or
testator intended to create a trust or a power.207
It would seem, therefore, that any further assimilation of
the rules of certainty for trust powers and bare powers will
probably require legislative intervention . In those jurisdictions
which enact provisions similar to section 16 of the perpetuities
Act of Ontario208 there will be a statutory precedent for treating
invalid trusts as valid powers. 209 Where such provisions are in
force a trust for a specific non-charitable purpose that creates no
enforceable interest in a specific person will be upheld as a valid
power. It is arguably anomalous that in such jurisdictions trust
powers for such persons as the trustee shall appoint cannot be
upheld as bare powers. If legislation were so, to provide the very
technical distinction between trust powers and bare powers would
cease to have any significance for questions relating to certainty
of objects.
(4) Delegation of testamentary power
The principle that a man cannot delegate-his power to make
a will is a precept of the civil law which was adopted by the law
of England. At the end of the sixteenth century, Swinburne
wrote :210
2105 R e Abraham's Will Trusts, supra, footnote 182; Re Eyre, supra,
footnote 182; Re Wootton Decsd, [1968] 1 W.L .R . 681; Re Manisty's Settlement, supra, footnote 173 ; cf ., Cook v. Duckenfield (1743), 2 Atk. 562;
Re Ogilvy, supra, footnote 14 ; in Re Abraham's Will Trusts Cross Y., said
that it was irrelevant that the donee in Re Park, supra, footnote 120, was
not a trustee. See also, Meagher v. Meagher (1915), 34 O.L .R. 33 ; Re
Hayes, [1938] O.W .N. 417; Re McCuag (1924), 25 O.W .N . 712; Calcino v.
Fletcher, supra, footnote 14 and Re McEwan, [1955] N.Z.L.R . 574 where
it was held that general powers had been created.
206 R e Pugh's Will Trusts, supra, footnote 14 ; Re Wootton Descd,
ibid .
207 See, e.g ., Re Dowsley, supra, footnote 140; cf ., Re Combe, supra,
footnote 140; Re Perowne, supra, footnote 140.
208 R.S .O ., 1970, c. 343.
209 At the time of writing Alberta appears to be the only jurisdiction
which has legislation of this kind : Perpetuities Act, S.A ., 1972, c. 121,
s. 20 .
210 Swinburne, A Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills
(1590),
Part I, s. 3 .
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Wherefore if the testator should refer his will to the will of another;
as if he should say, I give thee leave and authority to make my will,
and to make executor who thou wilt, etc. if hereupon thou didst make
a will in his name, and didst name an executor for him, yet this will is
void in law. For as thy soul is not my soul, so thy will is not my
will, nor thy testament my testament.
In this century the principle has been affirmed on several
occasions in the House of Lords,-"' the Privy Council''212 and the
High Court of Australia.'21 3 It has received some recent recognition in the Supreme Court of Ontario . 2 14 Notwithstanding its
antiquity and its recognition by tribunals of high authority, its
scope and in particular its effect on discretionary powers of
appointment created by will is not altogether clear.
One type of case to which the principle undoubtedly applies
is where the testator authorizes some other person to draft the
will without giving instructions as to its terms and then signs
the will without knowledge and approval of its contents . In
Hastilow v. Stobie2155 it was argued that such a delegation was
permissible . As, by definition, a will represents the deliberate
expression of the intentions of a competent testator with respect
to the succession to his property, it was held that in the absence
of his knowledge and approval of its contents such a document
would not reflect the "will" of the testator and, therefore, would
not be his will and testament.
Where a competent testator executes a will which, with his
full knowledge and approval, confers a discretionary power of
selection upon some other person, there is no conflict with the
requirement that the will should contain his intentions and not
those of some other person . To an extent, however, it is clear
that he has delegated the power of determining the ultimate dis211 Hauslon v. Burns, [1918] A.C . 337; A.G. v. National Provincial
Bank, [1924] A.C . 262; Chichester Diocesan Fund and Board of Finance
(Incorporated) v. Simpson, [1944] A.C . 341; Gordon, Delegation of
Will Making Power (1953), 69 L.Q. Rev . 334; Hardingham, The Rule
Against Delegation of Will-Making Power (1974), 9 Melb . U . L. Rev. 650.
21 2 A .G. of New Zealand v. New Zealand Insurance Co ., [1936] 3 All
E.R. 888; Leahy v. A .G. for New South Wales, [1959] A.C. 457, at
p. 484.
213 Tatham v. Huxtable (1950), 81 C.L .R. 639; Lutheran Church of
Australia v. Farmers' Co-operative Executors & Trustees Ltd, supra,
footnote 142; A.G. for New South Wales v. Donnelly (1958), 98 C.L.R .
538, aff'd sub non:. Leahy v. A.G. for New South Wales, ibid.
214See Re Lysiak (1975), 7 O.R . (2d) 317.
2155 (1869), L.R. 1 P. & D. 64 ; cf., In Bonis Smith (1869), L.R . 1 P.
& D. 717.
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position of his property and the question is whether his expression
of an intention to do this will be sufficient.

In all Commonwealth jurisdictions it is accepted that some
discretionary powers of selection may be created by will . General
powers of appointment, special powers where the potential objects
are all ascertainable and powers to distribute property between
bodies or purposes each of which is exclusively charitable will
not be invalid on the ground that they involve a delegation of
testamentary power.216 With respect to other powers the position
is less clear.
In the ultimate analysis the question is whether some discretionary powers which can be created by deed cannot be validly
created by will. A number of factors contribute to the present
difficulty of finding an answer in English law. First, in none of
the English cases in which testamentary powers have been
declared to be invalid on the ground of delegation would the
decision have been different if the power had been created in
the lifetime of the donor. 217 Second, most of the relevant dicta
in those cases are clearly too wide and would, if applied literally,
invalidate general powers or special powers in favour of an
ascertainable class .218 Third, in the line 'of cases which would
seem to involve the most complete delegation, powers have been
declared invalid on the ground of uncertainty without any reference to the principle which forbids delegation . 219 Fourth, in the
most recent decision in which the House of Lords considered the
rules relating to the certainty of the objects of trust powers
created inter vivos, cases concerning testamentary powers were
treated as relevant without any reference being made to the rule
against delegation .2"6
216 R e Hughes, supra, footnote 139, at p. 212; Re Neave, [1938]
Ch . 793, at p. 798 ; Tatham v. Huxtable, supra, footnote 213, at pp . 646647 per Latham C.J . (diss.,) .
217 Cases cited, supra, footnote 211.
218 See, e.g ., Chichester Diocesan Fund and Board of Finance (Incorporated) v. Simpson, supra, footnote 211, at pp. 348, per Viscount Simon
and 371, per Lord Simonds. See the comments of Cross J. in Re Abraham's
Will Trusts, supra, footnote 182, at p. 474.
219 Where property has been left to executors on trust to dispose
of as they should think fit the trust has been held to fail for uncertainty
of objects in many cases: e.g ., Vezey v. Jamson (1882), 1 Sim. & St . 69 ;
Buckle v. Bristow (1864), 10 Jur. N.S . 1095 ; Re Gilkinson (1930), 38
O.W.N . 26, aff'd. (1931), 39 O.W .N . 115; Re Hollole, [1945] V.L .R. 295;
contrast Re Howell, supra, footnote 14 ; Meagher v. Meagher, supra,
footnote 205 ; Re Hayes, supra, footnote 205.
220 Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No . I), supra, footnote 20 .
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On the basis of the existing authorities it would seem likely
that in English law no bare powers of selection which may be
validly created by deed will infringe the rule against delegation
if they are created by will . It has been recognized in a number
of cases at first instance that a testator may confer upon a trustee
or upon some other person a power to appoint to any person
other than himself or other specified persons. 221 One of these
cases has been cited with apparent approval in the House of
Lords."' It appears improbable that these decisions, of which
Re Park22 s appears to be the first in which the delegation principle
and the sweeping dicta which support it were considered, will now
be overruled. As they concerned almost the widest form of delegation short of the creation of a general power, it would seem that,
as applied to bare powers, the principle against delegation requires
only that the objects be described with the certainty required for
powers which have been created inter vivos.
The effect of the principle on trust powers created by will
is less certain. Prior to the decision of the House of Lords in
Baden (No. 1)2'24 it does not appear that the principle had any
independent significance for such powers . As the relevant rules
relating to certainty of objects required that all the objects of a
trust power, whether created by deed or will, should be ascertainable225 and, as trust powers in favour of an ascertainable class
did not infringe the delegation principle, that principle could at
the most serve as an additional but rather empty reason for invalidating a testamentary trust power of selection exercisable among
an unascertainable class. The repeated references to the principle
in cases decided in the first half of the twentieth century226 are
understandable in view of the fact that it was not until the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Inland Revenue Commissioners
v. Broadway Cottages Trust'=27 that the strict requirements of cer2'21 Cases cited, supra, footnotes 182 and 205 ; but see Re Denley's
Trust Deed, [1969] 1 Ch . 373, at p. 387. In Re Wootton Decsd, supra,
footnote 205, Pennycuick J., was clearly of the opinion that the same rules
govern the validity of testamentary bare powers and bare powers created
inter vivos.
222 Supra, footnote 182 .
223 Supra, footnote 120.
-24 Supra, footnote 20 .
5 I.R .C . v. Broadway Cottages Trust, [1955] 1 Ch . 20, overruled,
Re Baden's Deed Trusts (No. 1), supra, footnote 20 .
2'26 Cases cited, supra, footnotes 211 and 212.
"27 Supra, footnote 225.
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tainty for trust powers contained in settlements inter vivos were
clearly stated .
In view of the relaxation of the rules of certainty which was
accomplished by the decision in Baden (No. 1) for trust powers
created inter vivos, it is possible that the requirements of those
rules no longer coincide with those imposed by the delegation
principle and that it must still be shown that all the objects of a
testamentary trust power are ascertainable. If this is not the case,
the requirement that the objects of a trust power should constitute
a class of some kind will become all-important in the type of case
where a testator leaves property to his executors on trust for such
persons as they shall select. Similarly, a testamentary trust for
such charitable institutions or persons as the trustee shall select
will be valid unless it is held that the unqualified reference to
persons infringes the requirement that there be a class of objects.
Despite the fact that, in Baden (No. 1), the House of Lords was
concerned with a trust power contained in an inter vivos settlement and, despite the absence of any discussion of the delegation
principle, the indiscriminate citation of cases involving trust
powers created in wills suggests that the substantial assimilation
of the rules relating to trust powers to those relating to bare
powers was intended to apply whether the powers were created .
by deed or by will.
If the above suggestion is correct, the fact that a bare power
or a trust power is created by will and not by deed is, in English
law, of no significance for the purpose of certainty of objects
and the delegation principle has no independent importance or
significance with respect to such powers . It is at the most an
additional reason for requiring that the rules of certainty applicable to trust powers which have been created inter vivos should
be applied to those created by will.
In two decisions of the High Court of Australia much greater .
significance has been given to the delegation principle. 228 In
Tatham v. Huxtable 229 a testator attempted to dispose of the
residue of his estate in the following terms :
I hereby authorize and empower in law my executor . . . to distribute
any balance of my real and personal estate which may at the time of
my decease be possessed wholly or in part by me, to the beneficiaries
in this my Will and Testament, in addition to amounts already specified,
228 See Ilardingham, op . cit ., footnote 211 . The principle has been
applied to unrestricted powers of encroachment : ibid ., at pp. 661-664 . It
would seem most unlikely that this would be followed in Canada .
229 Supra, footnote 213 .
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or to others not otherwise provided for who, in [the opinion of the
executor] have rendered service meriting consideration by the testator.
By a majority the court held that the bequest infringed the rule
against delegation and was invalid . Fullagar J ., explained the basis
of the principle in words which recognized a distinction between
the requirements for the validity of dispositions inter vivos and
those which apply to dispositions by will :
It is inherent in the very nature of the power so given that it cannot
be delegated or exercised by an agent for the testator, and it seems to
me necessarily to follow that some powers of appointment, which would
be perfectly good in any instrument other than a will, are ineffective
in a will for the simple reason that they do not amount to a testamentary "disposition" of property, or indeed to any "disposition" of
property at all . It seems quite consistent with legal principle to say
that the creation by will of a general power of appointment (which has
been said to confer the equivalent of ownership) is a testamentary
disposition of property . 230
On this view the delegation principle has considerable
importance and cannot be regarded as merely an additional justification for the application to testamentary powers of the rules
relating to the certainty of the objects of powers created in a
settlement inter vivos. In the view of the learned judge a testamentary power of selection could be valid only if it was : (a)
completely general so that it might be regarded as equivalent to
property ; or (b) in favour of a class of objects defined with certainty ; or (c) in favour of objects which were exclusively charitable . He recognized that in the absence of a trust in default of
appointment, a special power to appoint among members of an
ascertainable class might involve no disposition by the testator.231
To say that there is a valid testamentary disposition in such a
case was, he said, a departure from principle which represents
"a natural enough `latitude' of view, which is perhaps characteristic of a system which has never regarded strict logic as its
sole inspiration" .2 .3-' In his opinion, such latitude could not be
extended to embrace cases where the class was not designated
with certainty . Although he did not indicate precisely the sense
in which the class must be described with certainty, he expressed
his disapproval of decisions such as Re Park 233 in which a testamentary bare power in favour of anyone other than the donee
of the power was held not to infringe the delegation principle .
230Ibid .,
231 Ibid.

at p . 649 .

232 Ibid .
233

Supra, footnote 120.
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It seems probable that Fullagar J., intended to restrict the class
of special or hybrid powers which can be validly created in a will
to those in which the objects are all ascertainable . Clearly, however, his reference to Re Park which was a case of a bare power,
indicates that he did not believe that the delegation principle
required any distinction to be drawn between the rules governing such powers and those applicable to trust powers . Similar
although slightly less emphatic views were expressed by the other
member of the majority, Ditto J.234
The effect of the delegation principle on attempts to create
discretionary powers in wills came before the High Court of
Australia again in Lutheran Church of Australia v. Farmers Co
operative etc. Ltd . 235 One issue in this case was whether the
following residtiary clause in a will was valid : .
My Trustees have discretionary power to transfer any mortgages, and
property, and Shares in Companies invested in my name to the Lutheran
Mission . . . for building Homes for Aged Blind Pensioners after All
expenses paid, and I desire that there shall be no subsequent adjustment
or apportionment therefore between any of the beneficiaries under my
will .
In the Supreme Court of South Australia, Bray C.J., held that
the clause was ineffective to dispose of any proprietary interest
of the testator and that it therefore infringed the rule against
delegation of testamentary power and was invalid.23E ®n appeal
the .High Court was equally divided and, in consequence, the
decision of Bray C.J., was affirmed .
In a joint judgment McTiernan and Menzies JJ., agreed with
the conclusion of Bray C.J., that the words did not effect any
gift of property . They referred to the reasoning of Fullagar J.,
which has been discussed above, and held that the clause did not
fall within the "latitude" allowed to special powers which contain
no gift in default of appointment. This conclusion is quite startling.
If latitude is to be extended to a discretionary power to appoint
among a class of specified individuals, it is very difficult to see
why a discretionary power to appoint to one specified object alone
should be treated any differently . In this respect the reasoning
of the learned judges extends the principle stated in Tatham v.
Huxtable and, at the same time, makes the distinction between
bare powers and trusts of crucial importance in a case where
there is only one object of the power.
Supra, footnote 213, at pp . 655-656.
Supra; footnote 142.
236 [1969] S.A .S .R. 115 (sub . nom., Ire Stapleton) .
234
235
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If the decision in Lutheran Church of Australia and the
reasons given by McTiernan and Menzies JJ ., widen the gap
between the English and Australian law relating to the principle
against delegation, Barwick C.J ., and Windeyer J., while not to
any extent affirming or denying the correctness of the decision in
Tatham v . Huxtable, were emphatic that the delegation principle
was not infringed by the clause in the will before them. Their
reasons were powerful and, it is submitted, compelling . They
referred to the absence of any uncertainty as to the object of the
power, the validity of bare powers in favour of a class in the
absence of a gift over or trust in default and, for the purposes
of the delegation principle, the complete lack of any justification
for a distinction between a bare power to appoint to X with an
express gift in default to a testator's next of kin and a similar
power with an implied gift or resulting trust to the next of kin.237
It is to be hoped that the approach which prevailed in

Tatham v . Huxtable and in the Lutheran Church case will not be

accepted in Canada and that the rule against delegation will not
be regarded as adding anything to the requirements of certainty
which apply to powers which have been created inter vivos .
Although the rule has been referred to on occasion there appears
to be nothing in the reported Canadian cases which would suggest
that it has any independent significance . 238 In Re Bethel,239
at first instance Grant J., quoted a statement of the rule by
Viscount Simon L.C ., but clearly regarded it as adding nothing
to the principles governing certainty of objects. In the Court of
Appeal'=4° Gale C.J .O ., dissenting, regarded the test of certainty
approved in Re Baden (No . 1) as applicable to the bequest at
issue and there is some indication that the other members of the
court agreed . On a further appeal the principles in Re Baden
(No . 1) received a measure of approval in the Supreme Court
of Canada.24 1
If the Baden test is to be applied to testamentary dispositions
there seems no room for the proposition that in Canada the rule
Cf., Cowper v . Mantell (1856), 22 Beav . 231 .
See, Sheard and Hull, Canadian Forms of Wills (3rd ed ., 1970),
pp . 271-272 .
239 [1970] 3 O .R . 745, at p . 750 .
240 [1971] 2 O .R . 316, at p . 321 .
2}1 Sub . nom ., Jones v . T . Eaton and Co . Ltd, [1973] S .C .R . 635,
at p . 651 . See also, Re Lysiak, supra, footnote 214 ; L. Stevens, Certainty
and Charity-Recent Developments in the Law of Trusts (1974), 52
Can . Bar Rev. 372 .
237
238
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against delegation will invalidate powers of selection or appointment which would otherwise be valid. Bare powers will be valid
if it is possible to say whether any given individual is within the
class. Trust powers will be valid if they satisfy the same test and
if in addition the objects constitute a class. Trust powers for such
persons other than the donee or other specified persons as the
donee shall select will continue to be invalid whether they appear
in a will or in a deed. Whether the ground of invalidity in the
former case is described in terms of uncertainty or of the rule
against delegation will be a matter of indifference .
(5) Release of powers
Some Canadian provinces have legislation which permits a
donee of a power to release it.242 In other provinces the possibility
of releases is governed by rules of common law and equity. These
rules permit the release of powers appurtenant and powers in
gross but not the release of collateral powers or powers which are
vested in trustees in their capacity as such.243 The legislation
enacted first in the United Kingdom in 1881 244 and subsequently
adopted in some Canadian provinces permits the release of at
least some collateral powers but not the release of the powers of
trustees . In Halsbury it is stated that even where the statutory
provisions are in force a power coupled with a duty or in the
nature of a trust cannot be released .245 There are some obiter
dicta which suggest that this exception is not confined to powers
which are held by trustees and that it extends to powers which are
coupled with a duty in some other sense.24E Halsbury's definition
of a power in the nature of a trust is a power that is fiduciary "in
the sense that the donee of the power is -a trustee of it, and has
an interest 'extensive enough to allow of its exercise".247 The
reference to the donee's interest quite obviously reflects the language of Lord Eldon L.C ., in Brown v. Higgs and does not seem
appropriate to cover cases in which the donee of a power
collateral is not a trustee.
242 Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, supra, footnote 31, s. 26;
Property Act, R .S .N .B ., 1973, c . P-19, s . 55 .
243 Sugden, op . cit., footnote 26, Ch . 3 ; Farwell, op . cit ., footnote 51,
Ch. 2 ; Montreal Trust Co . v . Minister of Finance (B .C .), [1974] 1
W .W .R . 231 .
244 Supra, footnote 17 .
245 Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed ., 1959), Vol . 30, p . 283 .
246 Re Mills, supra, footnote 192, at p . 669 ; Re Wills' Trust Deeds,
supra, footnote 55, at pp . 446-447 .
247 Op . Cit., footnote 245, at p. 210 .
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From the early years of the nineteenth century to the present
day the trust power terminology has been used in a bewildering
variety of different senses in cases in which the ability to release
a power was in issue.248 It seems quite clear that the fact that a
gift to the objects will be implied in default of the exercise of a
power of appointment which has been given to a life tenant will
not prevent the power from being released . Although such a
power was and is often called a power in the nature of a trust,
it was also a power in gross and by the middle of the nineteenth
century it was established that such powers could be released .249
Despite the previous authorities on this point the confusion in the
terminology appears to have misled Buckley J., in Re Wills' Trust
Deeds250 in which it was said that a power to appoint to a class
with an express or implied gift in default to the objects cannot
be released . 251
Where there are no statutory provisions which permit release
it would seem unnecessary to ask whether powers in the nature
of trusts can be released . Rather one merely has to ask whether
the power is appurtenant or in gross on the one hand or, on the
other hand, whether it is collateral or held by a trustee in his
capacity as such .
In jurisdictions in which legislation modelled on the provisions of the United Kingdom Conveyancing Act of 1881 is in
force there appear to be no decisions which have held that the
collateral powers of persons other than trustees cannot be
released . 2522 In view of the generality of the statutory language
there would seem to be no reason for assuming that the legislature intended to incorporate a distinction between some powers
collateral which can be released and some which, although not
given to trustees, are to be regarded as powers in the nature of
248 Supra, pp . 235-241 .

249 Supra,

footnote

26 .

footnote 55 .
2 51Ibid., at p. 236.
252 Re Eyre, supra, footnote 25, Weller v. Ker (1866), 15 L.T. 96
and Saul v. Pattinson (1886), 55 L.J . Ch . 831 concerned powers which
were held by trustees. Re Dunne's Trusts, supra, footnote 25, is sometimes
cited for the proposition that some powers collateral of persons other
than trustees cannot be released . The case was, however, decided before
the enactment of legislation which extended the range of releasable powers.
In Re Sonnes, supra, footnote 16, at p. 255, Chitty J ., distinguished the
first three cases mentioned on the ground that each of them concerned
a power held by a trustee -"a fiduciary power in the full sense of the
term" .
'50 Supra,
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trusts in some unspecified sense and which are therefore incapable
of release.
In Re Mills`-' 53 in which at least one judge accepted the
proposition that some powers of persons who are not trustees
are incapable of release it was said that the fact that the donee
did not intend the power to be released was not decisive 254 In
other cases it has been held that the fact that the power was
conferred for the benefit of persons other than the donee did not
make it incapable of release .255 In still other cases in which
releases were held to be effective it was stressed that the objects
could not compel the donee to exercise the power.256 Despite
the dicta to the contrary, the decisions seem to leave little room
for the application of any concept of a trust power which is not
simply a power vested in trustees in their capacity -as trustees .
If this is correct, a continued use of the trust power terminology
in this context is obviously undesirable.
(6) Assignments by objects
The distinction between trust powers and bare powers
appears to have no bearing on the ability of an object of a dispositive power to assign his -status as an object to some other
person. Whatever the classification of the power, whether it is
given to a trustee or some other person and whether it relates to
capital or income, the object qua object has no proprietary interest
which he can transfer .257 If a purported assignment is made for
value it may be construed as a contract to assign whatever the
object receives under an exercise of the power. Even in this case
it does not give the assignee the status of an object :
The payment of a money consideration cannot make a stranger become
the object of a power created in favour of children . He can only claim
under a valid appointment executed in favour of some, or one, of the
children 258
253 Supra, footnote 192 .
254 Ibid ., at p. 666.
2 55 Coffin v. Cooper, supra, footnote 25 . Re Radcliffe, supra, footnote
26 ; Paliner v. Locke, footnote 4.
258Re Greaves, [1954] Ch . 434, at pp. 446-447 ; Re Somes, supra,
footnote 16, at p. 255; Re Mills, supra, footnote 192, at pp . 670-671 .
257 See Re Rule's Settlement, [1915] V.L.R . 670; Gartside v. I.R .C.,
[1968] A.C . 564; Re Weir's Settlement Trusts, [1971] Ch . 145;
cf ., National Provincial Bank Ltd v. Ainsworth, [1965] A.C . 1175, at
pp . 1247-1248; Re McCreath, [1973] 1 O.R . 771, aff'd, [1973] 3 O.R.
413n, rev'd, S.C .C ., Feb. 25, 1976 not yet reported ; Hawkins, A Discretionary Object's Interest, [1968] British Tax Rev. 351 .
258 Daubeny v. Cockburn (1816), 1 Mer. 626, at p. 638.
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Thus in Re Coleman 2 9 one of a class of beneficiaries under a
trust power to distribute income purported to assign for value all
the "income property . . . estates and interests" to which he was
entitled under the instrument which created the power. It was
held, inter alia, that the trustees continued to be entitled to apply
the income for the maintenance, education or advancement of the
assignor and that the assignee was entitled to no interest in the
income except such part of it as was paid, delivered or appropriated to the assignor by the trustees.
1~

If all the objects of a trust power which is held by a trustee
are stti juris and in agreement they may direct the trustees as to
the manner and shares in which income is to be distributed and
may effectively assign the beneficial interest . 260 Similarly, if the
objects of a bare power are entitled in default of appointment they
may assign their interests in default. By itself such an assignment
will not deprive them of their status as objects of the power 261
and would not prevent them retaining any property which the
donee chose to appoint to them .

One situation in which the distinction between bare powers
and trust powers could be relevant to the question of assignments
would be where one of a class of objects purports to make a
voluntary assignment of his interest in default of appointment.
If the power is a bare power with an express or implied gift in
default to the objects, the assignment would be effective. If the
power was a trust power which was held by a trustee in that
capacity there would seem since the decision in Baden (No. 1) to
be no room for any gift in default of appointment. There would
be simply a trust which the court would enforce in favour of the
objects and, as was mentioned above, no object as such would
have any proprietary interest which he could assign. Whether the
position will be different where the donee of a trust power is not
a trustee depends again upon the theoretical basis upon which
the court will order a distribution in default of its exercise. If,
as is suggested,-6- the better view is that the court does not execute
a "trust" which imposes no enforceable obligation upon the donee
but simply implies a gift in equal shares in default, an object's
interest in default should be capable of assignment .
(1888), 39 Ch .D . 443 .
R e Sn:ith, [1928] Ch . 915 ; Re Nelson, [l928] Ch . 920n.
261 Sweetapple v . Horlock (1879), 11 Ch .D . 745 .
262 Supra, at pp . 259-260 .
s59
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(7) Survivorship of powers
Questions concerning the survival of powers can arise in a
number of situations . The power may have been conferred upon
a single donee and there may be a question whether it can be
exercised by his personal representative . If the power was originally to have been exercised by a number of persons jointly there
may be a question whether it can be exercised by the survivor or
survivors of those persons. The power may have been conferred
upon the occupant of some office or position and the question
may be whether it passes to succeeding occupants.
In the modern law the answer in every such case will depend
upon the intention of the donor of the power. For the purpose
of ascertaining the intention there are a number of rebuttable
presumptions which are supported by authority of some antiquity.
Consistently with the development in most parts of the law
affecting powers, the change - in judicial attitudes towards questions of construction has deprived some of these presumptions
of much of the weight which was given to them in cases decided
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Others have been
confirmed by statute.2'63
Prima facie, powers given to trustees as such and powers
vested in persons by virtue of some other office will survive the
death or retirement of one or more of the donees 264 Such powers
are presumed to have been annexed to the trust or office so that
they would remain exercisable by the trustee or other occupant
from time to time . Bare powers which have been given to individuals in their personal capacities are presumed not to
survive. 265 It is clear that this principle was recognized at least
as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century266 and it has
been applied in relatively recent Canadian cases?fi 7
The original concept of a bare power or "naked authority" 2611
as it was sometimes called for the purposes of the principles

263 E.g ., in Ontario as in most jurisdictions powers given to trustees
and personal representatives as such are presumed to survive : Trustee
Act, R.S .O ., 1970, c. 470, ss 3, 7, 25 and 46 .
264 Re Wills' Trust Deeds, supra, footnote 55 ; Re Bayley-Worthington
and Cohens Contract, [1908] 1 Ch. 26, aff'd., [1908] A.C . 97 ; Re Bacon,
[1907] 1 Ch . 475; Re Smith, [1904] 1 Ch . 139 .
2ORe Harding, [1923] 1 Ch . 182; Roach v. Roach, [1931] S.C .R. 512;
Re Simonton (1920), 53 D.L .R . 399 ; McKenzie v. McKenzie (1924), 56
O.L .R . 247; Re Ward, supra, footnote 140.
266 Co . Litt . 113a .
267 Canadian cases cited, supra, footnote 265.
2611 Mansell v. Mansell (1757), Wilm . 36, at p. 49 .
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relating to survivorship appears to have been similar to that of a
power collateral: a power with respect to property in which the
donee had no estate or interest . The rule that such powers would
be presumed not to survive was weakened when it was recognized that the presumption would not apply where a power was
given to a person in his capacity as the occupant of some office'ss
and in the most recent English cases the tendency has been to
ask simply whether the power was conferred upon the donee by
virtue of some office or, alternatively, in his personal capacity 270
If the power is given to all the trustees or executors it will be
presumed to be given to them virtute officii2271 and "the testator's
reliance on the individuals to the exclusion of holders of the office
for the time being must be expressed in clear and apt language" 272
If the powers are conferred by name upon only some of the
trustees the presumption will probably be against survival . 273 All
the presumptions mentioned are, of course, rebuttable and it has
been recognized that an instrument may indicate even that powers
which have been conferred upon trustees in their capacity as
trustees are not intended to survive.274
It would appear then that, if there is in the modern law
any principle that a bare power is presumed not to survive, the
term "bare power" must be understood to refer to a power which
is given to a person in his personal capacity and which relates to
property in which he has no interest. A statement that powers of
this kind are presumed not to survive is not incorrect but is also
not particularly helpful as it is now the capacity in which the
donee was given the power and not the absence of his interest
which affects the presumption .275 In this respect the terminology
in the older cases and even in the more modern treatises can
be misleading. The most obvious possibility for confusion lies in
the modern usage of the term "bare power" which is intended
Sugden, op. cit., footnote 26, p. 128.
See, e.g., Re Beesty's Will Trusts, [1966] Ch. 223 ; Re Sinith, supra,
footnote 264.
271 Crawford v. Forshaw, [1891] 2 Ch . 261 ; Re Smith, supra, footnote
264.
272 R e Smith, supra, footnote 264, at p. 144.
273 See Roach v. Roach, supra, footnote 265; Re Ward, supra, footnote
140 ; Paterson's Trustees v. Finlay, [1918] S.C. 714 .
274 McKenzie v. McKenzie, supra, footnote 265; Crawford v. Forshaw,
supra, footnote 271, at p. 268 ; Re Snzith, supra, footnote 264, at p. 144.
.''.75 In Re Beesty's Will Trusts, supra, footnote 270, a power given
to executors in their personal capacities was described as a "bare power"
but the presumption against survival was held to be rebutted on the
construction of the instrument.
200
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to indicate that the power is not a power in the nature of a trust
in some one or other of the senses in which the latter term has
been employed . It might, for example, be thought that, as a gift
to such of a class as A and B shall appoint is a power in the
nature of a trust in the sense in which that term was used in
Re Weekes' Settlement,276 it cannot be a bare power and will be
presumed to survive the death of one of the donees. There appears
to be no case in which this conclusion has been reached but the
real possibility of terminological confusion can be discerned in
the judgments in two Canadian cases in which it was thought
necessary to state that a power which was held not to survive was
not a power in the nature of a trust. 27 7

IV. Conclusion .
Over half a century has elapsed since Gray launched his attack
on the notion of powers in trust. The proposition he attempted
to sustain was that "whenever property, in default of appointment, passes to the objects of a power, it passes by implied gift,
and not by an exercise of the power" .278 Whether or not the
donee of a power was a trustee the power itself was not held in
trust and the courts could not execute it. Brown v. Higgs 2T9 with
its dicta to the contrary had been "a chief cause of confusion on
"
this topic . 28°
Although modern developments in Anglo-Canadian law have
made Gray's thesis untenable as far as the powers of trustees are
concerned, the soundness of his belief that the use of the trust
power terminology can engender confusion has been amply
demonstrated . This has been most evident when the ability of a
donee to release a power has been in issue. The fact that terms
such as "a power coupled with -a duty" have been described as
terms of art281 should not mislead anyone into thinking that the
duty is of a single unvarying character. 1f the trust power in
Brown v. Higgs was in all significant respects the same as that
discussed in Re Baden (No. 1)282 and Tempest v. Lord Camoys
276
277

Supra, footnote 19 .
Roach v . Roach, supra, footnote 265; Re Ward, supra, footnote

140. An unsuccessful attempt to rely on the terminology of fiduciary
powers was made by counsel in Re Harding, supra, footnote 265.
278 Op . cit ., footnote 4, at p. 3.
279 Supra, footnote 3 .
280 Op . cit ., footnote 4, at p. 3 .
281 R e Gestetner Settlement, supra, footnote 174, at p. 684, per Harman J.
2 s2Supra, footnote 20 .
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(No. 3),"8 the concepts referred to in Palmer v. Locke, 284 Re
Weekes' Settlement, 28,5 Re Dunne's Trusts-$' and Tempest v. Lord
Camoys (No. 2)287 are each quite separate and distinct. To this

extent the use of the terminology has created what Julius Stone
has described as a "legal category of concealed multiple reference".'s6 In cases such as Tempest v. Lord Camoys (No. 2) it is
very difficult to discern any meaning at all in the court's use of
the fiduciary language. In form it might appear as a justification
for the court's intervention ; in substance it reflects nothing more
than the court's assertion of its jurisdiction to intervene .'289

Where courts are faced with problems concerning releases,
the implication of gifts in default, assignments, survivorship or
delegation of testamentary power the fiduciary power terminol
ogy is unhelpful where it is not misleading . In cases which raise
questions relating to certainty of objects the distinction between
trust powers and bare powers is now only of significance in the
situation where the objects do not form a class of some kind.-.90
The continued importance of the distinction in this situation is
to be regretted.
The one type of problem in which the need to distinguish
between trust powers and bare powers might be regarded as of
major importance is where the court's jurisdiction to exercise a
power is in question . Even here it seems that the degree of
importance is often exaggerated. A court will always order a
trustee to perform his duties but only rarely will it take the discretion involved in a trust power out of the hands of the trustee.
The fact that its residual jurisdiction to exercise the discretion is
not confined to cases of trust powers and the emphasis which
Canadian courts have placed on a trustee's duty to turn his mind
to the existence of all his discretions are matters which detract
further from the importance of the distinction. Where it is alleged
that a trustee's failure to exercise a power involved him in a
breach of trust it will only be in the case where the trustee has
Supra, footnote 21 .
Supra, footnote 4.
285 Supra, footnote 19 ; discussed at pp . 260-264.
286 Supra, footnote 25 ; discussed at p. 241.
287 Siepra, footnote 23 ; discussed at p. 235.
288 Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (1964), pp. 246-248.
289 Stone's "legal category of meaningless reference", ibid ., pp. 241-246.
266 In jurisdictions in which trusts for specific non-charitable purposes
are invalid powers to apply property for such purposes may be upheld :
see Re Wootton Decsd, supra, footnote 205, at p. 688.
'=8s
284

19761

Fiduciary powers

28 9

mistaken a duty for a power that the distinction will be important.
In such cases and in others in which the same point of construction is in issue it must be very doubtful whether a solution is
facilitated or the basic distinction between duties and discretions
is clarified by importing the ambiguous language of fiduciary
powers .

